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The literature on R&D-driven economic growth suggests that technological innovations 
result from entrepreneurial activities such as R&D investments. In the next two chapters of this 
dissertation, I develop tractable frameworks to characterize and quantitatively evaluate the effects 
of patent policy on R&D and economic growth. As Acemoglu (p. 1112, 2007) writes,  
“… we lack a framework similar to that used for the analysis of the effects of 
capital and labor income taxes and indirect taxes in public finance, which we 
could use to analyze the effects… of intellectual property right polices… on 
innovation and economic growth.” 
 
In Chapter IV, I analyze the political economy of patent policy. 
 
What are the effects of blocking patents on R&D and consumption? To answer this 
question, in Chapter II, I develop a generalized quality-ladder growth model with overlapping 
intellectual property rights to quantify the inefficiency in the patent system. The analysis focuses 
on two policy variables: (a) patent breadth that determines the total profit received by a patent 
pool; and (b) the profit-sharing rule that determines the distribution of surplus between 
innovators. To quantify the inefficiency arising from blocking patents that are generated by these 
two policy variables, the model is calibrated to aggregate data of the US economy. Under 
parameter values that match key features of the US economy and show equilibrium R&D 
underinvestment, I find that eliminating blocking patents would lead to a conservatively 
estimated increase in R&D of 12% and long-run consumption of 4% per year. I also quantify the 
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transition-dynamic effects of patent policy and show implications that are different from previous 
studies in important ways. 
 
Is the patent length an effective policy instrument in stimulating R&D? To answer this 
question, in Chapter III, I develop a generalized variety-expanding growth model and calibrate 
the model to aggregate data of the US economy to quantify the effects of patent extension. At the 
empirical patent-value depreciation rates, extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads to a 
negligible increase in R&D despite equilibrium R&D underinvestment. On the other hand, 
shortening the patent length can lead to a significant reduction in R&D and consumption. The 
calibration exercise also suggests that about 35% to 45% of the long-run TFP growth in the US is 
driven by R&D. Finally, I identify and analytically derive a dynamic distortion of patent policy 
on saving and investment in physical capital that has been neglected by previous studies, which 
consequently underestimate the distortionary effects of patent protection. 
 
What are the welfare implications of pharmaceutical lobbying? Since the 80’s, the 
pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from the strengthening of patent protection 
for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry’s political influence. To analyze this 
phenomenon, in Chapter IV, I incorporate special interest politics into a quality-ladder growth 
model to consider the policymakers’ tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and 
campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical 
lobby distorting patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting but may 
improve global welfare in a multi-country setting, which features an additional efficiency tradeoff 
between monopolistic distortion and international free-riding on innovations. Finally, if the SIGs 
have asymmetric influences across countries, then the country, in which the government places a 
higher value on campaign contributions, would gain by less or even suffer a welfare loss.
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CHAPTER II 
Quantifying the Effects of Blocking Patents on R&D 
 
“Today, most basic and applied researchers are effectively standing on top of a 
huge pyramid… Of course, a pyramid can rise to far greater heights than could 
any one person... But what happens if, in order to scale the pyramid and place a 
new block on the top, a researcher must gain the permission of each person who 
previously placed a block in the pyramid, perhaps paying a royalty or tax to gain 
such permission? Would this system of intellectual property rights slow down the 
construction of the pyramid or limit its heights? … To complete the analogy, 




What are the effects of blocking patents on R&D? In an environment with cumulative 
innovations, the scope of a patent (i.e. patent breadth) determines the level of patent protection for 
an invention against imitation and subsequent innovations. This latter form of patent protection, 
which is known as leading breadth in the literature, gives the patentholders property rights over 
future inventions, and the resulting overlapping intellectual property rights may dampen the 
incentives for R&D. This phenomenon is referred to as blocking patents.  
 
The main contribution of this chapter is to develop an R&D-driven endogenous growth 
model to quantify this inefficiency in the patent system. To the best of my knowledge, this 
chapter is the first to perform a quantitative analysis on patent policy by calibrating a DGE model 
combining the following features: (a) overlapping intellectual property rights that are emphasized 
by the patent-design literature; (b) multiple R&D externalities that are commonly discussed in the 
growth literature; and (c) endogenous capital accumulation that leads to a dynamic distortionary 
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effect of patent protection on saving and investment and transition-dynamic effects different from 
previous studies. As Acemoglu (p. 1112, 2007) writes,  
“… we lack a framework similar to that used for the analysis of the effects of 
capital and labor income taxes and indirect taxes in public finance, which we 
could use to analyze the effects… of intellectual property right polices… on 
innovation and economic growth.”  
 
 
The analysis focuses on two policy variables: (a) patent breadth that determines the total 
profit received by a patent pool; and (b) the profit-sharing rule that determines the distribution of 
surplus between innovators. In order to quantify the inefficiency arising from blocking patents 
and other externalities, the model is calibrated to aggregate data of the US economy.1 I also show 
that the key equilibrium condition, which is used to identify the effects of blocking patents on 
R&D, can be derived analytically without relying on the entire structure of the DGE model. In 
particular, it can be derived from two conditions: (a) a zero-profit condition in the R&D sector; 
and (b) a no-arbitrage condition that determines the market value of patents. The DGE model 
serves the useful purpose of providing a structural derivation and interpretation on the effects of 
blocking patents. 
 
The main result is the following. Blocking patents have a significant and negative effect 
on R&D, and eliminating them would lead to a minimum increase in R&D of 12%. This result 
has important policy implications because given previous empirical estimates on the social rate of 
return to R&D, the market economy underinvests in R&D relative to the social optimum. To 
understand this finding, the DGE framework has been made rich enough to be consistent with 
either R&D overinvestment or underinvestment by combining blocking patents with multiple 
R&D externalities. Whether the market economy overinvests or underinvests in R&D depends 
crucially on the degree of externalities in intratemporal duplication and intertemporal knowledge 
                                                 
1 As a robustness check, the model is also calibrated to industry-level data of R&D-intensive industries. 
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spillovers, which in turn is calibrated from the balanced-growth condition between long-run TFP 
growth and R&D. The larger is the fraction of long-run TFP growth driven by R&D, the larger 
are the social benefits of R&D; as a result, the more likely it is for the market economy to 
underinvest in R&D. I use previous empirical estimates for the social rate of return to R&D to 
calibrate this fraction.   
 
Furthermore, the effects of eliminating blocking patents on consumption in the long run 
and during the transition dynamics are considered. When blocking patents are eliminated, the 
balanced-growth level of consumption increases by a minimum of 4% per year. During the 
transition dynamics, the economy does not always experience a significant fall in consumption in 
response to the resource reallocation away from the production sector to the R&D sector. Over a 
wide range of parameters, upon eliminating blocking patents, consumption gradually rises 
towards the new balanced-growth path by reducing investment in physical capital and temporarily 
running down the capital stock. This finding contrasts with Kwan and Lai (2003), whose model 
does not feature capital accumulation and hence predicts consumption losses during the transition 
path.  
 
Finally, I identify and analytically derive a dynamic distortionary effect of patent 
protection on saving and investment that has been neglected by previous studies on patent policy, 
which focus mostly on the static distortionary effect of markup pricing.2 The dynamic distortion 
arises because the markup in the patent-protected industries creates a wedge between the 
marginal product of capital and the rental price. Proposition 2 derives the sufficient conditions 
                                                 
2 Laitner (1982) is the first study that identifies in an exogenous growth model with overlapping 
generations of households that the existence of an oligopolistic sector and its resulting pure profit as 
financial assets creates both the usual static distortion and an additional dynamic distortion on capital 
accumulation due to the crowding out of households’ portfolio space. The current chapter extends this 
study to show that this dynamic distortion also plays an important role and through a different channel in an 
R&D-driven endogenous growth model in which both patents and physical capital are owned by 
households as financial assets. 
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under which: (a) the market equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital is below the 
socially optimal level; and (b) an increase in the markup reduces the equilibrium investment rate 
in physical capital. The numerical exercise also quantifies the discrepancy between the 
equilibrium capital investment rate and the socially optimal level and shows that eliminating 
blocking patents helps reducing this discrepancy. 
 
1.1.  Literature Review 
This chapter relates to a number of studies on R&D underinvestment and provides 
through the elimination of blocking patents an effective method to mitigate the R&D-
underinvestment problem suggested by Jones and Williams (1998) and (2000). Furthermore, the 
calibration exercise takes into consideration Comin’s (2004) critique that long-run TFP growth 
may not be solely driven by R&D. The current chapter also complements the qualitative partial-
equilibrium studies on leading breadth from the patent-design literature,3 such as Green and 
Scotchmer (1995), O’Donoghue et al (1998) and Hopenhayn et al (2006), by providing a 
quantitative DGE analysis. O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) is the first study that merges the 
patent-design and endogenous growth literatures to analyze the effects of patentability 
requirement, lagging and leading breadth on economic growth in a canonical quality-ladder 
growth model. However, their focus was not in quantifying the effects of blocking patents on 
R&D. In addition, the current chapter generalizes their model in a number of dimensions in order 
to perform a quantitative analysis on the transition dynamics. Other DGE analysis on patent 
policy includes Goh and Olivier (2002), Grossman and Lai (2004) and Li (2001).4 These studies 
                                                 
3 The seminal work on optimal patent length is Nordhaus (1969). Some other recent studies on optimal 
patent design include Tandon (1982), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990), O’Donoghue (1998), 
Hunt (1999) and Scotchmer (2004). Judd (1985) provides the first DGE analysis on optimal patent length.  
4 Goh and Olivier (2002) analyze the welfare effects of patent breadth in a two-sector variety-expanding 
growth model, and Grossman and Lai (2004) analyze the welfare effects of strengthening patent protection 
in developing countries as a result of the TRIPS agreement using a multi-country variety-expanding model. 
However, these studies do not analyze patent breadth in an environment with cumulative innovations. Li 
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are also qualitatively oriented and do not feature capital accumulation so that the dynamic 
distortionary effect of patent policy is absent.  
 
 In terms of quantitative analysis on patent policy, this chapter relates to Kwan and Lai 
(2003) and Chu (2007b). Kwan and Lai (2003) numerically evaluate the effects of extending the 
effective lifetime of patent in the variety-expanding model originating from Romer (1990) and 
find substantial welfare gains despite the temporary consumption losses during the transition path 
in their model. Chu (2007b) uses a generalized variety-expanding model and finds that whether or 
not extending the patent length would lead to a significant increase in R&D depends crucially on 
the patent-value depreciation rate. At the empirical range of patent-value depreciation rates 
estimated by previous studies, extending the patent length has only limited effects on R&D and 
thus social welfare. Therefore, Chu (2007b) and the current chapter together provide a 
comparison on the relative effectiveness of extending the patent length and eliminating blocking 
patents in mitigating the R&D-underinvestment problem. The crucial difference between these 
two policy instruments arises because extending the patent length increases future monopolistic 
profit while eliminating blocking patents raises current monopolistic profit for the inventors.   
 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the equilibrium 
condition that is used to identify the effects of blocking patents. Section 3 describes the DGE 
model. Section 4 calibrates the model and presents the numerical results. The final section 




                                                                                                                                                 
(2001) analyzes the optimal policy mix of R&D subsidy and lagging breadth in a quality-ladder model with 
endogenous step size, but he does not consider leading breadth. 
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2. An Intuitive Derivation of the Market-Equilibrium Condition for R&D 
 In this section, I show that the steady-state equilibrium condition for R&D that is crucial 
for the calibration can be derived from: (a) a zero-profit condition in the R&D sector; and (b) a 
no-arbitrage condition that determines the market value of patents. Intuitively, given the level of 
R&D spending in the data, the private benefit of R&D can be inferred from the zero-profit 
condition. Then, given the private benefit of R&D, the amount of the monopolistic profit received 
by current inventors can be inferred from the no-arbitrage condition. Finally, the discrepancy 
between the amount of profit received by current inventors and the total amount of monopolistic 
profit is attributed to blocking patents, and the DGE model serves the useful purpose of providing 
a structural derivation and interpretation of this discrepancy. 
 
 The zero-profit condition in the R&D sector implies that  
(1) DRV &=λ .  
V  is the market value of a patented invention for its inventor, and λ  is the Poisson arrival rate of 
innovations. DR &  is the amount of R&D spending. The no-arbitrage condition implies that the 
market value of a patented invention is the expected present value of monopolistic profit received 











where r  is the real interest rate, and πg  is the growth rate of monopolistic profit. Because of 
blocking patents, an inventor may only capture a fraction of the monopolistic profit generated by 
her invention. 
(3) icmonopolistinventorcurrent πνπ ._ = ,  
where ]1,0(∈ν . At this point, the interpretation of ν  is quite vague, and the DGE model 
provides a structural interpretation of ν  as the backloading discount factor, which captures the 
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In the case of industry-level data, µ  is the industry markup and Y is the valued-added of R&D-
intensive industries. Since empirical estimates for industry markup are known to be imprecise, I 
will perform the calibration using both industry-level data and aggregate data to ensure the 
robustness of the numerical results. Calibration based on aggregate data requires an additional 
assumption that economic profit in the economy is created by intellectual monopoly. Given this 
assumption, µ  in (5) becomes the aggregate or average markup in the economy and Y in (5) 
becomes the value of GDP.  
 
 
3. The Model 
The model is a generalized version of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and 
Howitt (1992). The final goods, which can be either consumed by households or invested in 
physical capital, are produced with a composite of differentiated intermediate goods. The 
intermediate goods are produced with labor and capital, and there are both competitive and 
monopolistic industries in the intermediate-goods sector. The relative price between the 
monopolistic and competitive goods leads to the usual static distortionary effect that reduces the 
output of final goods. The markup in the monopolistic industries drives a wedge between the 
marginal product of capital and the rental price; consequently, it leads to an additional dynamic 
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distortionary effect that causes the market equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital to 
deviate from the social optimum. The R&D sector also uses both labor and capital as factor 
inputs.  
 
To prevent the model from overestimating the social benefits of R&D and the extent of 
R&D underinvestment, the long-run TFP growth is assumed to be driven by R&D as well as an 
exogenous process as in Comin (2004). The class of first-generation R&D-driven endogenous 
growth models, such as Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), exhibits 
scale effects and is inconsistent with the empirical evidence in Jones (1995a).5 In the present 
model, scale effects are eliminated by assuming decreasing individual R&D productivity as in 
Segerstrom (1998), which becomes a semi-endogenous growth model.6  
  
The various components of the model are presented in Sections 3.1–3.7, and the 
decentralized equilibrium is defined in Section 3.8. Section 3.9 summarizes the laws of motion 
that characterize the transition dynamics, and Section 3.10 discusses the balanced-growth path. 
Section 3.11 derives the socially optimal allocations and the dynamic distortionary effect of 
patent protection. 
 
3.1. Representative Household 
The infinitely-lived representative household maximizes life-time utility that is a function 
of per-capita consumption tc  of the numeraire final goods and is assumed to have the iso-elastic 
form given by 
                                                 
5 See, e.g. Jones (1999) for an excellent theoretical analysis on scale effects. 
6 In a semi-endogenous growth model, the balanced-growth rate is determined by the exogenous labor-
force growth rate. An increase in the share of R&D factor inputs raises the level of the balanced growth 
path while holding the balanced-growth rate constant. Since increasing R&D has no long-run growth effect 
in this model, the calibrated effects on consumption in the numerical exercises are likely to be more 


















where 1≥σ  is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ρ  is the subjective 
discount rate. The household has )exp(
.0 tnLLt =  members at time t. The population size at time 
0 is normalized to one, and 0>n  is the exogenous population growth rate. To ensure that 
lifetime utility is bounded, it is assumed that n>ρ . The household maximizes (6) subject to a 
sequence of budget constraints given by  
(7)  ttttt cwnraa −+−= )(& . 
Each member of the household inelastically supplies one unit of homogenous labor in each period 
to earn a real wage income tw . ta  is the value of risk-free financial assets in the form of patents 
and physical capital owned by each household member, and tr  is the real rate of return on these 
assets. The familiar Euler equation derived from the intertemporal optimization is  
(8)  σρ /)( −= ttt rcc& . 
 
3.2. Final Goods 
This sector is characterized by perfect competition, and the producers take both the 
output price and input prices as given. The production function for the final goods tY  is a Cobb-
Douglas aggregator of a continuum of differentiated quality-enhancing intermediate goods 












)(lnexp djjXY tt .
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7 To maintain the analytical tractability of the aggregate conditions, a Cobb-Douglas aggregator instead of 
the more general CES aggregator is adopted. With the CES aggregator, it becomes very difficult to derive 
the aggregate conditions when there are both competitive and monopolistic industries in the intermediate-
goods sector. Furthermore, computation of the transition dynamics becomes possible under the Cobb-
 12 












= ∫ djjPP tt , 
and the demand curve for each variety of intermediate goods is  
(11) ttt YjXjP =)()( . 
 
3.3. Intermediate Goods 
There is a continuum of industries producing the differentiated quality-enhancing 
intermediate goods )( jX t  for ]1,0[∈j . A fraction )1,0[∈θ  of the industries is characterized 
by perfect competition because innovations in these industries are assumed to be non-patentable. 
Each of the remaining industries is dominated by a temporary industry leader, who owns the 
patent for the latest R&D-driven technology for production. Without loss of generality, the 
industries are ordered such that industries ),0[ θ∈′j  are competitive and industries ]1,[θ∈j  are 
monopolistic. The production function in each industry has constant returns to scale in labor and 
capital inputs and is given by  





t αα −=  
for ]1,0[∈j . )(, jK tx  and )(, jL tx  are respectively the capital and labor inputs for producing 
intermediate-goods j at time t. )exp(0 tgZZ Zt =  represents an exogenous process of 
productivity improvement that is common across all industries and is freely available to all 
producers. 
)( jmtz  is industry j’s level of R&D-driven technology, which is increasing over time 
through R&D investment and successful innovations. 1>z  is the exogenous step-size of a 
technological improvement arising from each innovation. )( jmt , which is an integer, is the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Douglas aggregator. Although the arrival rate of innovations varies along the transitional path, a tractable 
form for the law of motion for aggregate technology can still be derived under the Cobb-Douglas 
aggregator but not under the CES aggregator. 
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number of innovations that has occurred in industry j as of time t. The marginal cost of 






























where tR  is the rental price of capital. The optimal price for the leaders in the monopolistic 
industries is a constant markup ),( ηµ z  over the marginal cost of production given by  
(14) )(),()( jMCzjP tt ηµ=  
for ]1,[θ∈j . The markup ),( ηµ z  is a function of the quality step size z  and the level of patent 
breadth η  (to be defined in Section 3.4). The competitive industries are characterized by 
competitive pricing so 
(15) )()( jMCjP tt ′=′  
for ),0[ θ∈′j . The aggregate price level is   
(16) tt MCzP ),,(
~ θηµ= . 












)(lnexp djjMCMC tt . 
 
3.4. Patent Breadth 
Before providing the underlying derivations, this section firstly presents the Bertrand 
equilibrium price and the amount of monopolistic profit generated by an invention under different 
levels of patent breadth, which is denoted by η .  
(18) )()( jMCzjP tt
η= , 
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(19) )()()1()( jXjMCzj ttt −=
ηπ ,8 
for ,...}3,2,1{∈η  and ]1,[θ∈j . The expression for the equilibrium price is consistent with the 
seminal work of Gilbert and Shapiro’s (1990) interpretation of “breadth as the ability of the 
patentee to raise price.” A broader patent breadth corresponds to a larger η , and vice versa. 
Therefore, an increase in patent breadth potentially enhances the incentives for R&D by raising 
the amount of monopolistic profit generated by each invention but worsens the distortionary 
effects of markup pricing.  
 
 The patent-design literature has identified and analyzed two types of patent breadth in an 
environment with cumulative innovations: (a) lagging breadth; and (b) leading breadth. In a 
standard quality-ladder growth model, lagging breadth (i.e. patent protection against imitation) is 
assumed to be complete while leading breadth (i.e. patent protection against subsequent 
innovations) is assumed to be zero. The following analysis assumes complete lagging breadth and 
focuses on non-zero leading breadth, and the formulation originates from O’Donoghue and 
Zweimuller (2004).9  
 
The level of patent breadth leadlag ηηη +=  can be decomposed into lagging breadth 
denoted by ]1,0(∈lagη  and leading breadth denoted by ,...}2,1,0{∈leadη . In the following, 
complete lagging breadth is assumed such that leadηη += 1 . Nonzero leading breadth protects 
patentholders against subsequent innovations and gives the patentholders property rights over 
future inventions. For example, if 1=leadη , then the most recent innovation infringes the patent 
of the second-most recent inventor. If 2=leadη , then the most recent innovation infringes the 
patents of the second-most and the third-most recent inventors, etc. The following diagram 
                                                 
8 Note that the inventor may only capture a fraction of this monopolistic profit because of blocking patents. 
9 See, e.g. Li (2001) for a discussion of incomplete lagging breadth. 
 15 
illustrates the concept of nonzero leading breadth with an example in which the degree of leading 
breadth is two. 
 
Therefore, nonzero leading breadth facilitates the new industry leader and the previous inventors, 
whose patents are infringed, to consolidate market power through licensing agreements or the 
formation of a patent pool resulting in a higher markup.10 The Bertrand equilibrium price with 
leading breadth is  
(20) )()( 1 jMCzjP tt
leadη+=  
for ,...}2,1,0{∈leadη  and ]1,[θ∈j . Assumption 1 is sufficient to derive this equilibrium markup 
price.  
 
Assumption 1: An infringed patentholder cannot become the next industry leader while she is 
still covered by a licensing agreement in that industry.
11 
 
Then, the amount of monopolistic profit captured by the licensing agreement at time t is  
(21) )()()1()( 1 jXjMCzj ttt
lead −= +ηπ  
for ,...}2,1,0{∈leadη  and ]1,[θ∈j . 
 
                                                 
10 See, e.g. Gallini (2002) and O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004), for a discussion on market-power 
consolidation through licensing agreements.  
11 The sufficiency of this assumption in determining the markup price is most easily understood with an 
example. Suppose leading breadth is one and lagging breadth is complete, the lower bound on the profit-
maximizing markup is the square of z , which is the limit price from the collusion of the most recent and 
the second-most recent inventors against the third-most recent inventor, whose patent is not infringed upon 
by the most recent invention. In this example, the limit-pricing markup would be even larger if the third-
most recent inventor happens to be the new industry leader. Continuing this reasoning, the markup could 
grow without bound; therefore, Assumption 1 is made to rule out this possibility. The empirical plausibility 
of this assumption is appealed to the existence of antitrust policy.  
)( jmtz  2)( +jmtz  
patent protection for 
)( jmtz  
1)( +jmtz  
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 The share of profit obtained by each generation of patentholders in the patent pool 
depends on the profit-sharing rule (i.e. the terms in the licensing agreement). A stationary 
bargaining outcome is assumed to simplify the analysis.  
 
Assumption 2: The profit-sharing rule is symmetric across industries and is stationary. For each 
degree of leading breadth ,...}2,1,0{∈leadη , the profit-sharing rule is ]1,0[),...,( 1 ∈ΩΩ=Ω η
ηlead , 
where iΩ  is the share of profit received by the i-th most recent inventor, and 11 =Ω∑ =
η
i i .  
 
Although the shares of profit and licensing fees eventually received by the owner of an invention 
are constant overtime, the present value of profit is determined by the actual profit-sharing rule. 
The two extreme cases are: (a) complete frontloading )0,...,0,1(=Ω leadη ; and (b) complete 
backloading )1,...,0,0(=Ω leadη . Complete frontloading maximizes the incentives on R&D 
provided by leading breadth by maximizing the present value of profit received by an inventor. 
The opposite effect of blocking patents arises when profit is backloaded, and complete 
backloading maximizes this damaging effect on the incentives for R&D. The law of motion for 
the market value of ownership for each generation of patentholders will be derived in Section 3.7.  
 









≡ ∫ zdjjmA tt ln)(exp
1
0
 as the aggregate level of R&D-driven technology. 
Also, define total labor and capital inputs for production as ∫=
1
0




,, )( djjLL txtx  respectively. 
 
 17 
Lemma 1: The aggregate production function for the final goods is  
(22) 
ααηϑ −= 1 ,,)( txtxttt LKZAY , 
where )1/()()( θθηϑ ηθη −+≡ zz  is decreasing in η  for )1,0(∈θ . 
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.□ 
 
)(ηϑ  captures the static distortionary effect of the markup ηz . Markup pricing in the 
monopolistic industries distorts production towards the competitive industries and reduces the 
output of the final goods. Also, )(ηϑ  is initially decreasing in θ  and subsequently increasing 
with 1)( =ηϑ  for }1,0{∈θ . Therefore, at least over a range of parameters, the static 
distortionary effect becomes increasingly severe as the fraction of competitive industries 
increases. The distortionary effect is not monotonic in θ  because the relative-price distortion 
disappears when either all industries are monopolistic or competitive.  
 
The market-clearing condition for the final goods is  
(23) ttt ICY += , 
where ttt cLC =  is the aggregate consumption and tI  is the investment in physical capital. The 
factor payments for the final goods are  





ππ djjtt  is the total amount of monopolistic profit. Substituting (12) and (13) into (19) 

















Therefore, the growth rate of monopolistic profit equals the growth rate of output. The factor 































(27) shows that the markup drives a wedge between the marginal product of capital and the rental 
price. As will be shown below, this wedge creates a dynamic distortionary effect on the rate of 
investment in physical capital. Finally, the correct value of GDP should include R&D investment  
(28) trttrttt KRLwYGDP ,, ++= .
12 
trL ,  and trK ,  are respectively the number of workers and the amount of capital for R&D.  
 
3.6. Capital Accumulation 
 The market-clearing condition for physical capital is  
(29) trtxt KKK ,, += .  
tK  is the total amount of capital in the economy at time t . The law of motion for capital is  
(30) δttt KIK −=&   
δ  is the rate of depreciation. The endogenous rate of investment in physical capital is  
(31) ttttt YKKKi /)/( δ+= &   
for all t. The no-arbitrage condition δ−= tt Rr  for the holding of capital and (27) imply that the 
capital-output ratio is  
                                                 
12 In the national income account, private spending in R&D is treated as an expenditure on intermediate 
goods. Therefore, the values of investment and GDP in the data are 
t
I  and 
t
Y  respectively. The Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and the National Science Foundation’s R&D satellite account provides preliminary 


















































In the Romer model, (skilled) labor is the only factor input for R&D (i.e. 0, =tKs ); therefore, the 
distortionary effect of markup pricing on the steady-state rate of investment in physical capital is 
unambiguously negative (i.e. 0/ <∂∂ ηi ). In the current model, there is an opposing positive 
effect operating through the R&D share of capital. Intuitively, an increase in patent breadth 
potentially raises the private return on R&D and increases the R&D share of capital. Proposition 
2 in Section 3.11 shows that the negative distortionary effect still dominates if the intermediate-
goods sector is at least as capital intensive as the R&D sector. 
 
3.7. R&D 
)( jVt  is the market value of the patent pool created by the most recent invention in 
industry ]1,[θ∈j  at time t and is determined by the following no-arbitrage condition  
(34) )()()()( jVjVjjVr tttttt λπ −+= & . 
The first terms in the right is the flow profit captured by the patent pool at time t. The second 
term is the capital gain due to the growth in the amount of monopolistic profit. The third term is 
the expected value of capital loss due to creative destruction, and tλ  is the Poisson arrival rate of 
the next invention that creates a new patent pool. However, the incentives for R&D depend on the 
market value of the shares in patent pools obtained by the next inventor. Denote )(, jV ti  for 
},...,1{ η∈i  as the market value of ownership in patent pools for the i-th most recent inventor in 
industry ]1,[θ∈j .  
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Proposition 1: )(, jV ti  for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and ]1,[θ∈j  is determined by the following law of 
motion 
(35) ))()(()()()( ,,1,, jVjVjVjjVr titittititit −++Ω= +λπ & , 








































Proof: Refer to Appendix A.□ 
 
The intuition behind (35) is very similar to (34) with two differences. Firstly, the i-th most recent 
inventor in industry j only captures a share iΩ  of the flow profit. Secondly, when the next 
invention occurs, the i-th most recent inventor losses )(, jV ti  but gains )(1, jV ti +  as she becomes 
the i+1-th most recent inventor in the next patent pool. Once (35) has been derived for 
},...,2,1{ η∈i , (36) can be derived by recursive substitutions to obtain an expression for )(,1 jV t .  
 
Assumption 3: Innovation successes of the R&D entrepreneurs are randomly assigned to the 

























































                                                 
13 A reasonable implication of this assumption is that the equilibrium level of R&D is determined by the 
amount of monopolistic profits in the economy.  
14 Note that the second equality is obtained by firstly integrating over (35) and then by recursive 
substitutions.  
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The arrival rate of an innovation success for an R&D entrepreneur ]1,0[∈h  is a function of labor 
input )(, hL tr  and capital input )(, hK tr  given by 
(38) )()()( 1 ,, hLhKh trtrtt
ββϕλ −= . 
tϕ  is a productivity parameter that the entrepreneurs take as given. The expected profit from 
R&D is  
(39) )()()()]([ ,,,1, hKRhLwhVhE trttrttttrt −−= λπ . 
The first-order conditions are  
(40) ttrtrtt whLhKV =−
βϕβ ))(/)(()1( ,,,1 ,  
(41) ttrtrtt RhLhKV =
−1
,,,1 ))(/)((.
βϕβ .  
 
 To eliminate scale effects and capture various externalities, I follow Jones and Williams 
(2000) to assume that the individual R&D productivity parameter tϕ  is given by  
(42) 




,, )( dhhKK trtr  and ∫=
1
0
,, )( dhhLL trtr . ]1,0(∈γ  captures the negative externality in 
intratemporal duplication or the so-called “stepping-on-toes” effects, and )1,(−∞∈φ  captures 
the externality in intertemporal knowledge spillovers.15 Given that the arrival of innovations 
follows a Poisson process, the law of motion for R&D-driven technology is given by   
                                                 
15 This specification captures how semi-endogenous growth models eliminate scale effects as in Jones 
(1995b). )1,0(∈φ  corresponds to the “standing-on-shoulder” effect, in which the economy-wide R&D 
productivity ϕqA  increases as the level of R&D-driven technology increases (see the law of motion for 
R&D-driven technology). On the other hand, )0,(−∞∈φ  corresponds to the “fishing-out” effect, in which 
early technology is relatively easy to develop and ϕqA  decreases as the level of R&D-driven technology 
increases. 
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γββφββ −− ===& .16 
 
3.8. Decentralized Equilibrium 
The analysis starts at 0=t . The equilibrium is a sequence of allocations 
∞
=0,,,, },),(),(),(),(),(,,,,{ ttttrtrtxtxttttt LKhLhKjLjKjXYIca  and a sequence of prices 
∞
=0,1 }),(,,,{ tttttt VjPRrw  such that they are consistent with the initial conditions 
},,,,{ 00000 ϕAZLK  and their subsequent laws of motions. Also, in each period,  
(a) the representative household chooses },{ tt ca  to maximize utility taking },{ tt rw  as 
given;  
(b) the competitive firms in the final-goods sector choose )}({ jX t  to maximize profit 
according to the production function taking )}({ jPt  as given; 
(c) each industry leader in the intermediate-goods sector chooses )}(),(),({ ,, jLjKjP txtxt  
to maximize profit according to the Bertrand price competition and the production 
function taking },{ tt wR  as given;  
(d) the competitive firms in the intermediate-goods sector choose )}(),({ ,, jLjK txtx ′′  to 
maximize profit according to the production function taking },),({ ttt wRjP ′  as given;  
(e) each entrepreneur in the R&D sector chooses )}(),({ ,, hLhK trtr  to maximize profit 
according to the R&D production function taking },,,{ ,1 tttt wRVϕ  as given;  
(f) the market for the final-goods clears such that ttt ICY += ; 
(g) the full employment of capital such that trtxt KKK ,, += ; and 
                                                 
















∫=∫= ττλ ; then, simple 
differentiation yields zAA
ttt
ln/ λ=& . 
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(h) the full employment of labors such that trtxt LLL ,, += . 
 
3.9. Aggregate Equations of Motion 
 The transition dynamics of the decentralized equilibrium is characterized by the following 
differential equations. The capital stock is a predetermined variable and evolves according to  
(44) δtttt KCYK −−=& . 
R&D-driven technology is also a predetermined variable and evolves according to  
(45) zAA ttt lnλ=
& . 
Consumption is a jump variable and evolves according to the Euler equation  
(46) σρ /)( −= ttt rcc& . 
The market value of ownership in patent pools is also a jump variable and evolves according to  
(47) titittittti VVrV πλλ Ω−−+= + ,1,, )(&  
for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and 0,1 =+ tVη . 
 
At the aggregate level, the generalized quality-ladder model is similar to Jones’s (1995b) 
model, whose dynamic properties have been investigated by a number of recent studies. For 
example, Arnold (2006) analytically derives the uniqueness and local stability of the steady state 
with certain parameter restrictions. Steger (2005) and Trimborn et al (2007) numerically evaluate 
the transition dynamics of the model. In summary, to solve the model numerically, I firstly 
transform },,,{ ,tittt VcAK  in the differential equations into its stationary form,
17 and then, 
compute the transition path from the old steady state to the new one using the relaxation 
algorithm developed by Trimborn et al (2007).  
 
                                                 
17 Refer to Appendix B for the details. 
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3.10. Balanced-Growth Path 
Equating the first-order conditions (26) and (40) and imposing the balanced-growth 
condition on R&D-driven technology 
(48) zKLg trtrtA ln,
1
,
ββϕ −=  




























































lead  is defined as the backloading discount factor. 
For example, in the case of complete frontloading, 1)( =Ω leadην . Similarly, solving (27), (41) and 



































On the balanced-growth path, tc  increases at a constant rate cg , so that the steady-state 
real interest rate is  
(51)  σρ cgr += . 












































Then, the steady-state rate of creative destruction is zg A ln/=λ . The balanced-growth rates of 
other variables are given as follows. Given that the steady-state investment rate is constant, the 
balanced-growth rate of per capita consumption is 
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(53) ngg Yc −= . 
From the aggregate production function (22), the balanced-growth rates of output and capital are  
(54) )1/()( α−++== ZAKY ggngg . 
Using (52) and (54), the balanced-growth rate of R&D-driven technology is determined by the 






























Long-run TFP growth denoted by ZATFP ggg +≡  is empirically observed. For a given TFPg , a 
higher value of Zg  implies a lower value of Ag  as well as a lower calibrated value for 
)1/( φγ − , which in turn implies that R&D have smaller social benefits and the socially optimal 
level of R&D spending is lower.  
 
3.11. Socially Optimal Allocations and Dynamic Distortion 
 This section firstly characterizes the socially optimal allocations and then derives the 
dynamic distortion on capital accumulation. To derive the socially optimal rate of investment in 
physical capital and R&D shares of labor and capital, the social planner chooses ti , tLs ,  and tKs ,  



















 subject to: (a) the aggregate production function given by 
αααα −−−−= 11,, )1()1( tttLtKttt LKssZAY ; (b) the law of motion for capital given by 




γββγγββγφ −−=& . After deriving the first-order conditions, the social 
planner solves for 
*
i , *Ls  and 
*
Ks  on the balanced-growth path. 
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and the socially optimal steady-state R&D shares of labor 
*
Ls  and capital 
*

































































































































Proof: Refer to Appendix A.□ 
 
(57) and (58) indicate the various sources of R&D externalities: (a) the negative externality in 
intratemporal duplication given by ]1,0(∈γ ; (b) the positive or negative externality in 
intertemporal knowledge spillovers given by )1,(−∞∈φ ; (c) the static consumer-surplus 
appropriability problem given by ]1,0(/)1)(1( ∈−− ηηθ zz , which is a positive externality; (d) 
the markup distortion in driving a wedge of 1/)1( ≥−+ ηη θθ zz  between the factor payments 
for production inputs and their marginal products; (e) the positive externality of cumulative 
innovations together with the negative externality of creative destruction (i.e. the business-
stealing effect) given by the difference between ))1(/( AcA ggng +−+− σρ  and 
))1(/( λσρλ +−+− cgn ; and (f) the negative effects of blocking patents on R&D through the 
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backloading discount factor ]1,0()( ∈Ω leadην . Given the existence of positive and negative 
externalities, it requires a numerical calibration that will be performed in Section 4 to determine 
whether the market economy overinvests or underinvests in R&D. 
 
 If the market economy underinvests in R&D as also suggested by Jones and Williams 
(1998) and (2000), the government may want to increase patent breadth to reduce the extent of 
this market failure. However, the following proposition states that even holding the effects of 
blocking patents constant, an increase in η  mitigates the problem of R&D underinvestment at the 
costs of worsening the dynamic distortionary effect on capital accumulation in addition to 
worsening the static distortionary effect.  
 
Proposition 2a: The decentralized equilibrium rate of capital investment i  is below the socially 
optimal investment rate 
*
i  if either there is underinvestment in R&D or labor is the only factor 
input for R&D.  
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.□ 
 
Proposition 2b: Holding the backloading discount factor ν  constant, an increase in patent 
breadth leads to a reduction in the decentralized equilibrium rate of capital investment i  if the 
intermediate-goods sector is at least as capital intensive as the R&D sector.   
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.□ 
 
A higher aggregate markup increases the wedge between the marginal product of capital and the 
rental price. This effect by itself reduces the equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital; 
however, there is an opposing effect from the R&D capital share. Proposition 2b shows that the 
intermediate-goods sector being more capital intensive than the R&D sector is a sufficient 
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condition for the negative effect to dominate. As for Proposition 2a, the discrepancy between the 
equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital and the social optimum arises because of: (a) 
the aggregate markup; and (b) the discrepancy between the market equilibrium R&D capital share 
Ks  and the socially optimal R&D capital share 
*
Ks . Since the equilibrium capital investment rate 
i  is an increasing function of Ks , the underinvestment in R&D in the market equilibrium is 
sufficient for 
*
ii < . On the other hand, when there is overinvestment in R&D in the market 
equilibrium, whether i  is below or above 
*
i  depends on whether the effect of the aggregate 
markup or the effect of R&D overinvestment dominates. For the case in which labor is the only 




 Using the framework developed above, this section provides a quantitative assessment on 
the effects of blocking patents. Figure II-1 shows that private spending on R&D in the US as a 
share of GDP has been rising sharply since the beginning of the 80’s. Then, after a few years, the 
number of patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office also began to increase rapidly 
as shown in Figure II-2. Given the patent policy changes in the 80’s, the structural parameters are 
calibrated using long-run aggregate data of the US’s economy from 1953 to 1980 to examine the 
extent of R&D underinvestment and inefficiency arising blocking patents before these policy 
changes. The goal of this numerical exercise is to quantify the effects of eliminating blocking 
patents on R&D, consumption and capital investment. After calibrating the model using 
aggregate data, an alternative calibration based on industry-level data from R&D-intensive 
industries will be performed to ensure the robustness of the finding that the negative effect of 
blocking patents on R&D is significant. 
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4.1. Backloading Discount Factor 
The first step is to calibrate the structural parameters and the steady-state value of the 
backloading discount factor ν . The average annual TFP growth rate TFPg  is 1.33%,
18 and the 
labor-force growth rate n is 1.94%.19 The annual depreciation rate δ  on physical capital and the 
household’s discount rate are set to conventional values of 8% and 4% respectively. For the 
aggregate markup 
θµµ −= 1~ , Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) estimate that the aggregate markup is 
about 1.1 (i.e. a 10% markup) in the data; on the other hand, Basu (1996) and Basu and Fernald 
(1997) estimate that the aggregate production function has constant return to scale and the 
aggregate profit share is 3%. These estimates imply that the aggregate markup is about 1.03.20 To 
be conservative, I will set µ~  to the lower value at 1.03.21 For a given µ~ , each value of θ  (the 
fraction of competitive industries in the intermediate-goods sector) corresponds to a unique value 
for the industry markup µ  in monopolistic industries, and I will consider a wide range of values 
for }75.0,5.0,25.0,0{
...
∈θ . A number of structural studies based on patent renewal models has 
estimated the arrival rate of innovations λ , and I will consider a reasonable range of values for 
]20.0,04.0[
.
∈λ .22 For the capital intensity parameter in the R&D sector, I will set αβ =  as the 
benchmark case.23  
 
                                                 
18 Multifactor productivity for the private non-farm business sector is obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
19 The data on the annual average size of the labor force is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
20 Cost minimization implies that the return to scale = the markup x (1 – profit share). 
21 As a robustness check, an aggregate markup of 1.1 implies that the negative effect of blocking patents on 
R&D is even more severe. Intuitively, a higher markup means increased profitability which must be offset 
by a stronger effect of blocking patents in order for the level of R&D in the data to be constant. In this case, 
eliminating blocking patents would lead to a more significant increase in R&D and consumption.  
22 For example, Lanjouw (1998) structurally estimate a patent renewal model using patent renewal data in a 
number of industries from Germany, and the estimated probability of obsolescence ranges 7% for computer 
patents to 12% for engine patents. Also, a conventional value for the rate of depreciation in patent value is 
about 15% (e.g. Pakes (1986)). On the other hand, Caballero and Jaffe (2002) estimate a mean rate of 
creative destruction of about 4%. 
23 I have considered different plausible values for }3,2,,0{ αααβ ∈  as a sensitivity analysis. The extent of 
R&D underinvestment and the effects of eliminating blocking patent and increasing patent breadth on long-
run consumption are robust to these parameter changes.  
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 For the remaining parameters },,{ σαν , the model provides three steady-state conditions 











































































































 for the case of 
βα = . The average private spending on R&D as a share of GDP is 0.0115,24 and the labor share 
is set to a conventional value of 0.7. The average ratio of private investment to GDP is 0.203.25  
 
Table II-1 presents the calibrated values for the structural parameters along with the real 
interest rate )1/(
.
ασρ −+= TFPgr  and the industry markup 
)1/(1)03.1( θµ −=  for 
}75.0,5.0,25.0,0{
...
∈θ  and ]20.0,04.0[
.
∈λ . Table II-1 shows that for a given value of θ , the 
calibrated values for },,{ rσα  are invariant to different values of λ . The calibrated value for the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (i.e. σ/1 ) is about 0.42, which is closed to the empirical 
estimates from econometric studies.26 The implied real interest rate is about 8.4%, which is 
                                                 
24 The data is obtained from the National Science Foundation and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. R&D 
is net of federal spending, and GDP is net of government spending. The observations in the data series of 
R&D spending are missing for 1954 and 1955.  
25 This number is calculated using data obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and GDP is net of 
government spending.  
26 It is well-known that there is a discrepancy between the estimated elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
from dynamic macro models (closed to 1) and econometric studies. Guvenen (2006) shows that this 
discrepancy is due to the heterogeneity in households’ preferences and wealth inequality. In short, the 
average investor has a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution while the average consumer has a much 
lower elasticity. Since my interest is on consumption, it is appropriate to calibrate the value of σ  according 
to the average consumer. 
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slightly higher than the historical rate of return on the US’s stock market, and this higher interest 
rate implies a lower optimal level of R&D spending and a higher steady-state value of the 
backloading discount factor. As a result, the model is less likely to overstate the extent of R&D 
underinvestment and the degree of inefficiency from blocking patents. Re-expressing (59) into 













Furthermore, the fact that the calibrated values of ]892.0,485.0[
.
∈ν  are smaller than one 
suggests inefficiency from blocking patents in the economy. Therefore, eliminating blocking 
patents may be an effective method to stimulate R&D. After calibrating the externality 
parameters and computing the socially optimal level of R&D spending, the effects of eliminating 
blocking patents will be quantified.  
 
4.2. Externality Parameters 
The second step is to calibrate the values for the externality parameters γ  (intratemporal 
duplication) and φ  (intertemporal spillover). For each value of Ag , Zg , n , α  and β , the 
balanced-growth condition (55) determines a unique value for )1/( φγ − , which is sufficient to 
determine the effect of R&D on the balanced-growth level of consumption. However, holding 
)1/( φγ −  constant, a larger γ  implies a faster rate of convergence to the balanced-growth path; 
therefore, it is important to consider different values of γ . As for the value of Ag , I will set 
TFPA gg .ξ=  for ]1,0[ .∈ξ . The parameter ξ  captures the fraction of long-run TFP growth that is 
driven by R&D, and the remaining fraction is driven by the exogenous process tZ  such that 
TFPZ gg )1( ξ−= . Table II-2 presents the calibrated values of φ  for ]0.1,1.0[ .∈γ  and 
]1,0[
.
∈ξ . Table II-2 shows that the calibrated values for φ  are very similar across different 
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values of θ  implying that the socially optimal level of R&D spending and the extent of R&D 
overinvestment or underinvestment are about the same across different values of θ . 
 To reduce the plausible parameter space of γ  and ξ , I make use of the empirical 
estimates for the social rate of return to R&D. Following Jones and Williams’ (1998) derivation, 































With a lower bound of 0.30 for r~ , (63) pins down a lower bound for γ  under each value of ξ . 
Table II-3 presents the implied social rate of return r~  for ]0.1,1.0[
.
∈γ  and ]1,0[
.
∈ξ , and the 
values exceeding 0.30 are highlighted in bold.  
 
4.3. Socially Optimal Level of R&D Spending 
This section calculates the socially optimal level of R&D share 
)1/()1/()1( ****
. KKLL ssss −+−− αα . Figure II-3 plots the socially optimal R&D shares for the 
range of values for γ  and ξ  that satisfies the lower bound of 0.30 for r~ . Figure II-3 shows that 
there was underinvestment in R&D prior to 1980 over the entire range of parameters. Since it is 
difficult to determine the empirical value of ξ , I will leave it to the readers to decide on their 
preferred values and continue to present results for this range of parameters.  
 
4.4. Eliminating Blocking patents 
Given the calibrated structural parameters, this section quantifies the effects of 
eliminating blocking patents on R&D and consumption. Table II-4 shows that eliminating 
blocking patents (i.e. setting 1=ν ) would lead to a substantial increase in the steady-state share 
of R&D by a minimum of 12% and a maximum of 106%. In the following, the effect of 
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eliminating blocking patents is firstly expressed in terms of the percent change in the balanced-
growth level of consumption per year. Along the balanced-growth path, per capita consumption 
increases at an exogenous rate cg . Therefore, after dropping the exogenous growth path and 
some constant terms and solving for the balanced-growth path of R&D technology and steady-
state capital-labor ratio, I derive the expression for the endogenous parts of long-run consumption 
as a function of the steady-state value of the backloading discount factor ν  through the capital 
investment rate )(νi , and the R&D shares of capital and labor (where )()()( ννν KLr sss ==  
because βα = ). 
 
Lemma 3: For βα = , the expression for the endogenous parts of consumption on the balanced-
























0 ))(1()())(1()()( rr ssiic .
27 
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.□ 
 
Therefore, in the case of a change in ν , the percent change in long-run consumption can be 






























































Figure II-4 shows that eliminating blocking patents would lead to a substantial increase in long-
run consumption by a minimum of 4% and a maximum of 67%. Also, a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation shows that the change in consumption mostly comes from 
                                                 
27 The proof in Appendix I also derives the expression for the general case in which βα ≠ . 
28 Note that the coefficients are determined by )1/( φγ −  rather than the individual values of γ  and φ . 
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)(ln)))1)(1/((( ναγφαγ rs∆−−− ; in other words, the other general-equilibrium effects only 
have secondary impacts on long-run consumption. 
 
 After examining the effect on long-run consumption, the next numerical exercise 
computes the entire growth path of consumption upon eliminating blocking patents. Figure II-5a 
compares the transition path (in blue) of log consumption per capita with its original balanced-
growth path (in red) and its new balanced-growth path (in green) for the following parameters 
}08.0,0,1.0,55.0,55.0{},,,,{ =δθλγξ  to illustrate the transition dynamics. Then, I will discuss 
the effects of changing these parameter values. Upon setting 11 =Ω=ν , consumption per capita 
gradually rises towards the new balanced growth path. Although factor inputs shift towards the 
R&D sector and the output of final goods drops as a result, the possibility of investing less and 
running down the capital stock enables consumption smoothing. To compare with previous 
studies, such as Kwan and Lai (2003), Figure II-5b presents the transition dynamics for 
}1,0,1.0,55.0,55.0{},,,,{ =δθλγξ  as an approximation to a model with no capital 
accumulation. In this case, the result is consistent with Kwan and Lai (2003) that consumption 
falls in response to the strengthening of patent protection. In this case, consumption falls by about 
2% on impact and only recovers to its original growth path after 4 years. 
 
 A sensitivity analysis has been performed for different values of ξ  and γ . At a larger 
value of either ξ  or γ , consumption increases by even more on impact. A larger ξ  also implies 
a higher position of the new balanced-growth path. Holding ξ  constant, a larger γ  implies a 
faster rate of convergence. When both ξ  and γ  are smaller than 0.55, the household suffers 
small consumption losses during the initial phase of the transition path. For example, Figure II-5c 
presents the transition dynamics for =},,,,{ δθλγξ  }08.0,0,1.0,3.0,3.0{ . However, Figure II-
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5d shows that when ξ  is closed to one, γ  could be as small as 0.3 without causing any short-run 
consumption losses. In summary, reallocating resources from the production sector to the R&D 
sector does not always lead to short-run consumption losses. Finally, at a larger value of λ , the 
calibrated value for ν  becomes smaller (see Table II-1). This larger magnitude of the policy 
shock increases slightly the range of parameter values that corresponds to short-run consumption 
losses.  
 
4.5. Dynamic Distortion 
Proposition 2a derives the sufficient condition under which the market equilibrium rate of 
investment in physical capital is below the socially optimal level in (56). The following numerical 
exercise quantifies this wedge. Figure II-6 presents the socially optimal rates of capital 
investment along with the US’s long-run ratio of private investment to GDP of 0.203, and the 
wedge is about 0.024 on average. The equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital in the 
long run is increasing in the R&D share of capital; therefore, eliminating blocking patents also 
increases the rate of capital investment. Table II-5 shows that upon eliminating blocking patents, 
the steady-state capital investment rate increases by 0.0017 on average and moves slightly toward 
the socially optimal level.  
 
4.6. Robustness Check Based on Industry-Level Data 
 As mentioned in Section 2, the use of aggregate data relies on the assumption that 
economic profit in the economy is created by intellectual monopoly. In this section, I will 
perform a robustness check on the finding that the negative effect of blocking patents on R&D is 




























This numerical exercise requires an estimate for the markup in R&D-intensive industries, and I 
will make use of the empirical estimates for industry-level returns to scale from Basu et al (2006). 
Assuming cost minimization and non-negative economic profit, the estimates for the returns to 
scale provide a lower bound for the industry markups.  
  
 Based on the data on R&D from the National Science Foundation, I choose four R&D-
intensive industries that account for 67% of the private R&D spending in manufacturing from 
1980 to 1997: chemical products (SIC 28); machinery (SIC 35); electrical equipment (SIC 36); 
and motor vehicles (SIC 371). I add up the industries’ total R&D spending for each year and then 
divide this number by the value added of these industries. The annual average ratio of R&D over 
value added is 0.117. The real interest rate is set to 8.4% as before, and πg  is set to the long-run 
GDP growth rate of 3.4%. I will consider a range of values for ]20.0,04.0[∈λ , and the valued-
added weighted average return to scale from Basu et al (2006) is 1.30 in these R&D-intensive 
industries. Then, I divide this number by the aggregate profit share of 0.03 from Basu and Fernald 
(1997) to obtain a conservative estimate of 1.34 for the average markup in these R&D-intensive 
industries.29 Figure II-7 shows that the calibrated values for ν  are far below one unless the arrival 
rate of innovations λ  is very small. Therefore, the data at both the aggregate and industry levels 




This chapter has attempted to accomplish three objectives. Firstly, it develops a tractable 
framework to model the transition dynamics of an economy with overlapping intellectual 
                                                 
29 This estimate is conservative because the share of economic profits in an R&D-intensive industry should 
be much higher than in the average industry because of the intellectual monopoly created by patent 
protection. For example, Comin (2004) argues that the average markup in patent-protected industries 
should be at least 1.5.  
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property rights and patent pools in a generalized quality-ladder growth model. Secondly, it 
identifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent policy on capital accumulation that has been 
neglected by previous studies. Thirdly, it applies the model to the aggregate data of the US 
economy to quantify the extent of underinvestment in R&D and inefficiency arising from 
blocking patents. The numerical exercise suggests the following findings. If R&D investment is 
important for TFP growth, then the inefficiency created by blocking patents is a major reason for 
the underinvestment in R&D in the US. In addition, making the patent system more efficient can 
have substantial effects on R&D and consumption. From a policy perspective, the patent 
authority should mitigate the effects of blocking patents through the following policies: (a) 
compulsory licensing with an upper limit on the amount of licensing fees charged to subsequent 
inventors of more advanced technology; and (b) making patent-infringement cases in court 
favorable to subsequent inventors of more advanced technology. 
  
Finally, the readers are advised to interpret the numerical results with some important 
caveats in mind. The first caveat is that although the quality-ladder growth model has been 
generalized as an attempt to capture more realistic features of the US economy, it is still an 
oversimplification of the real world. Furthermore, the finding of eliminating blocking patents 
having substantial and positive effects on R&D and consumption is based on the assumptions that 
the empirical estimates for the social rate of return to R&D and the data on private R&D spending 
are not incorrectly measured by an order of magnitude. The validity of these assumptions remains 
as an empirical question. Therefore, the numerical results should be viewed as illustrative at best. 
 38 
CHAPTER III 
Quantifying the Effects of Patent Length on R&D 
 
1. Introduction 
Is the patent length an effective policy instrument in stimulating R&D? The statutory 
term of patent in the US was 17 years from 1861 to 1995 and then extended to 20 years as a result 
of the TRIPS agreement. Suppose that there is underinvestment in R&D in the market economy 
as suggested by Jones and Williams (1998) and (2000), why hasn’t the term of patent been 
lengthened to stimulate R&D?30 Especially, Kwan and Lai (2003) show in a variety-expanding 
growth model that extending the effective lifetime of patents would lead to a substantial increase 
in R&D and consequently welfare gains.  
  
This chapter attempts to provide an answer to the above questions by developing a 
generalized variety-expanding growth model and calibrating the model to the aggregate data of 
the US economy to analyze the effects of extending the patent length. It turns out that whether an 
extension in the patent length would lead to a significant increase in R&D depends crucially on 
whether the model is calibrated properly to match the empirical patent-value depreciation rate. 
The numerical exercise suggests that at the empirical range of patent-value depreciation rates, 
extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads to only a very small increase in R&D despite 
R&D underinvestment in the market economy. On the other hand, shortening the patent length 
                                                 
30 The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), initiated in 
the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, extends the statutory term of patent in the US from 17 years (counting from 
the issue date when a patent is granted) to 20 years (counting from the earliest claimed filing date) to 
conform with the international standard. Because of the difference in the starting date, the effective 
extension of patent length was much shorter than 3 years. 
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can lead to a significant reduction in R&D and consumption. In other words, the patent length 
loses its effectiveness in stimulating R&D at around 20 years. This chapter also makes use of the 
DGE framework to examine the fraction of TFP growth that is driven by R&D. The calibration 
exercise suggests that about 35% to 45% of the long-run TFP growth in the US is driven by 
R&D. Finally, this chapter identifies and analytically derives a dynamic distortion of the patent 
length on saving and investment in physical capital that has been neglected by previous studies, 
which consequently underestimate the distortionary effects of patent protection. The dynamic 
distortion arises because when the patent length increases, the fraction of monopolistic industries 
goes up. The resulting higher aggregate markup causes the wedge between the marginal product 
of capital and the rental price to increase. As a result, the market equilibrium rate of investment in 
physical capital decreases and deviates further from the social optimum. 
 
 This chapter relates to a number of studies on R&D underinvestment. In a companion 
paper, Chu (2007a) numerically evaluates the effect of blocking patents on R&D in a generalized 
quality-ladder growth model with overlapping intellectual property rights, and he finds that 
eliminating blocking patents can be very effective in stimulating R&D. In performing a similar 
quantitative analysis, Chu (2007a) and the current chapter together provide a quantitative 
assessment on the relative effectiveness of extending the patent length and eliminating blocking 
patents in solving the R&D-underinvestment problem suggested by Jones and Williams (1998) 
and (2000). The crucial difference arises because extending the patent length affects future 
monopolistic profits while eliminating blocking patents affects current monopolistic profits. 
Furthermore, the calibration exercise takes into consideration Comin’s (2004) critique. Comin 
(2004) argues two points: (a) Jones and Williams’ (2000) finding of R&D underinvestment is 
based on the assumption in their calibration that the long-run TFP growth is solely driven by 
R&D; and (b) the level of R&D spending in the data may be optimal if R&D only drives a small 
fraction of the long-run TFP growth. The current chapter contributes to this debate by bringing in 
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an additional moment that is the patent-value depreciation rate in order to calibrate the fraction of 
long-run TFP growth driven by R&D, and the details will be discussed in Section 2.9.  
 
 This chapter also complements the theoretical studies in the patent-design literature that 
is mostly based on a partial-equilibrium setting by providing a quantitative DGE analysis on 
patent policy. The seminal work on patent length is Nordhaus (1969), and he concludes that the 
optimal patent length should balance between the static distortionary effects of markup pricing 
and the gains from enhanced innovations. Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) argue that given the choices 
of patent length and patent breadth as policy instruments, the socially optimal policy combination 
is an infinite patent length and a minimum degree of patent breadth.31 In a DGE setting, Judd 
(1985) also concludes that the optimal patent length is infinite.32 On the other hand, Futagami and 
Iwaisako (2003) show that the optimal patent length may be finite when there is no 
underinvestment in R&D. However, the above studies do not feature endogenous capital 
accumulation so that the dynamic distortion on capital accumulation is absent.  
 
 In terms of quantitative analysis, the most closely related work is Kwan and Lai (2003), 
and they find substantial welfare gains from extending the effective lifetime of patent. There is an 
important reason for the contradicting results between Kwan and Lai (2003) and the current 
chapter. By using the same final-goods production function as in Romer (1990), Kwan and Lai 
(2003) necessarily restrict the size of the markup to the inverse of the capital share. This setup 
restricts the balanced-growth rate of monopolistic profits captured by each patent to equal the 
population growth rate that is nonnegative. Relaxing this parameter restriction indicates that at the 
                                                 
31 Some other studies on optimal patent design include Tandon (1982), Klemperer (1990), Green and 
Scotchmer (1995), O’Donoghue (1998), O’Donoghue, Schotchmer and Thisse (1998), Hunt (1999) and 
Schotchmer (2004).  
32 Some other DGE studies on patent policy include Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), O’Donoghue and 
Zweimuller (2004) and Grossman and Lai (2004). However, all of these studies neglect the dynamic 
distortion on capital accumulation and are qualitatively oriented. Chu (2007a) provides a more detailed 
discussion on these studies.  
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empirical range of patent-value depreciation rates estimated by previous studies, the implied 
growth rates of the number of varieties (that are no longer the same as the TFP growth rate) are 
very high; consequently, the share of monopolistic profits captured by each patent declines 
sharply overtime rendering patent extension ineffective in stimulating R&D. In other words, the 
potentially rapid decline in the market share captured by each patent due to the introduction of 
new varieties enables the model to feature the empirically observed depreciation in the market 
value of patents. As a result, extending the patent length has limited effects on R&D. 
 
 Before closing the introduction, I briefly survey the empirical literature on estimating the 
market value of patents using patent renewal data to gather some information about the 
magnitude of the rate at which a patent’s value declines overtime.33 The pioneering study that 
estimates a deterministic patent renewal model is Pakes and Schankerman (1984), and they find 
that the market value of patents depreciates at a rate of 25% per year with a 95 percent confidence 
interval of 18%-36%. Schankerman and Pakes (1986) provide more recent data on a number of 
European countries, in which about half of all patents are not renewed within 10 years and only 
10% of them are renewed until the end of the statutory term.34 Pakes (1986) develops a stochastic 
renewal model to capture the effect of learning about a patent’s value in the initial years, and he 
also finds high rates of depreciation ranging from 11.4% in Germany to 19.0% in the United 
Kingdom. Lanjouw (1998) uses a more general stochastic renewal model to estimate the value of 
patents in a number of industries. In addition to the rates of depreciation, her model also estimates 
the annual probability that a patent becomes obsolete (i.e. complete depreciation), and it ranges 
from 7% for computer patents to 12% for engine patents. Although the empirical estimates tend 
                                                 
33 For a more detailed survey on early studies, see e.g. Griliches (1990). 
34 All the studies cited here are based on European data. In the US, patent maintenance fees were not 
initiated until 1982, and the fees are due 3.5 years ($900), 7.5 years ($2300) and 11.5 years ($3800) after a 
patent is granted, rather than annually as in some European countries.   
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to vary across studies, across countries and across industries, there seems to be suggestive 
evidence that the rates of depreciation and obsolescence are quite high for patents.  
 
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and derives 
the dynamic distortionary effect of the patent length. Section 3 calibrates the model to the data, 
and the final section concludes with some important caveats. All proofs are contained in 
Appendix E.  
 
 
2. The Model 
The variety-expanding model is a generalized version of Romer (1990). The basic 
framework is modified to introduce a finite patent length denoted by T for each invented variety 
of intermediate goods. The final goods are produced with labor and a composite of intermediate 
goods. The intermediate-goods industries are monopolistic for the producers owning a valid 
patent and become competitive once the patent expires. The relative price between the 
monopolistic and competitive goods leads to the usual static distortionary effect that reduces the 
output of final goods. The markup in the monopolistic industries drives a wedge between the 
marginal product of capital and the rental price; consequently, it leads to an additional dynamic 
distortionary effect that causes the market equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital to 
deviate from the social optimum. To prevent the model from overestimating the social benefits of 
R&D and hence the extent of R&D underinvestment, the long-run TFP growth is assumed to be 
driven by R&D as well as an exogenous process as in Comin (2004). In addition, this class of 
first-generation R&D-driven endogenous growth models exhibits scale effects and is inconsistent 
with the empirical evidence in Jones (1995a).35 In the present model, scale effects are eliminated 
as in Jones (1995b). After eliminating scale effects, the resulting model becomes a semi-
                                                 
35 See Jones (1999) for an excellent theoretical analysis on scale effects. 
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endogenous growth model, in which the balanced-growth rate is proportional to the exogenous 
population growth rate.  
  
The various components of the model are presented in Sections 2.1–2.8, and the 
competitive equilibrium is defined in Section 2.9. Section 2.10 derives the socially optimal 
allocations, and Section 2.11 derives the dynamic distortionary effect of the patent length on 
capital accumulation. The analysis focuses on the balanced-growth path. 
 
2.1. Representative Household 

















where 1≥σ  is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ρ  is the exogenous 
subjective discount rate. The household has 
tn
t eL
.=  members at time t, and 0>n  is the 
constant exogenous population growth rate. ρ  is assumed to be greater than n  to ensure that 
utility is bounded. tc  is the per capita consumption of final goods (the numeraire). The household 
maximizes utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by  
(2) ttttt cwanra −+−= )(& . 
Each member of the household inelastically supplies one unit of homogenous labor in each period 
to earn a wage income tw . ta  is the amount of financial assets, which consist of physical capital 
and patents, owned by each member of the household, and tr  is the real rate of return on these 
financial assets. From the household’s intertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler equation is  
(3) σρ /)(/ −= ttt rcc& .  
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Along the balanced growth path, tc  increases at a constant rate cg . Therefore, the equilibrium 
real interest rate along the balanced-growth path is  
(4) σρ cgr += . 
 
2.2. Final Goods 
The sector producing the final goods is characterized by perfect competition, and the 
producers take both the output price and input prices as given. In particular, the final-goods 



















ttytt djjXLZY   
for )/1,0(
.
αη ∈ . tY  is the amount of final goods produced. )exp(0 tgZZ Zt =  represents an 
exogenous process of productivity improvement that is freely available to all final-goods 
producers. tyL ,  is the number of production workers. )( jX t  is the amount of intermediate goods 
of variety ],0[ tVj ∈ , in which tV  is the number of varieties that has been invented as of time t. 
The production function in (5) nests Romer (1990) as a special case with 1=η  and 1=tZ  for all 
t. For 1=η , the monopoly markup µ  is restricted to be α/1  (i.e. roughly the inverse of the 
capital share); therefore, Jones and Williams (2000) propose a more realistic specification that 
allows η  to differ from one so that the markup is given by )/(1 αηµ =  in order to relax the 
parameter restriction between the markup and the capital share.  
 
 The final-goods producers take 
α−1
tZ  as given. The current chapter includes this 
exogenous TFP process for two reasons: (a) to avoids the mistake in assuming that the long-run 
TFP growth in the data is solely driven by R&D; and (b) to relax the restriction between the 
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patent-value depreciation rate and the long-run TFP growth rate denoted by TFPg . This restriction 
will be discussed in details in Section 2.9. In short, by setting 0=zg  (i.e. by assuming that the 
long-run TFP growth is solely driven by R&D), the balanced-growth rate of the number of 
varieties Vg  is pinned down by the TFP growth rate TFPg , the capital share α , and the markup 
)/(1 αη . Once Vg  is determined, the patent-value depreciation rate is also uniquely pinned 
down, and the calibration results suggest that this implied patent-value depreciation rate differs 
substantially from the previous empirical estimates based on patent renewal data. Therefore, the 
current chapter adopts the specification in (5) that allows zg  to differ from zero in order to bring 
in the empirical estimates for the patent-value depreciation rate and perform a more realistic 
calibration.  
 
Profit maximization yields the first-order conditions for the wage rate and the price of 
intermediate-goods )( jPt  for ],0[ tVj ∈  given by  


























αηααα  . 
 
2.3. Intermediate Goods 
There is a continuum of industries, indexed by ],0[ tVj ∈ , producing the differentiated 
intermediate goods )( jX t . Once a variety has been invented, the production function in industry 
j  is  
(8) )()( , jKjX tyt = . 
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)(, jK ty  is the amount of capital employed by industry j . The profit function facing the 
producer(s) of variety j  is  
(9) )()()()( , jKRjXjPj tytttt −=π . 
tR  is the rental price of capital. Denote the steady-state fraction of monopolistic industries by .ω , 
which is endogenously determined by the patent length T. Without loss of generality, the 
industries are ordered such that industries ],0[
. tVj ω∈  are protected by patents and industries 
],(
. tt VVj ω∈′  are not protected by patents. Then, the first-order conditions are 
(10) αη/)( tt RjP =   
for ],0[
. tVj ω∈ , and  
(11) tt RjP =′)(   
for ],(
. tt VVj ω∈′ . 
 
2.4. Aggregate Production Function and Static Distortion 
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Lemma 1: The aggregate production function for the final goods is  
(13) 





~ −−−= , 
where tA  is the level of R&D-driven TFP and is defined as 
(14) 
ηαηα /)1(1 −− ≡ tt VA , 
and 
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~ω  is strictly less than one for )1,0(
.
∈ω  and equals one for }1,0{
.
∈ω . In addition, 



















ωω .  
Proof: See Appendix E.□ 
 
.
~ω  captures the usual static distortionary effect of patent protection in creating a monopolistic 
markup in the patent-protected industries. In other words, the markup in the monopolistic 
industries distorts production towards the competitive industries and thus reduces the total output 
of the final goods. Increasing the fraction of monopolistic industries worsens this static 
distortionary effect when 
..
ωω < . This static distortionary effect is not monotonic in the patent 
length because at an infinite patent length, all industries are monopolistic and the relative-price 
distortion disappears. 
 
2.5. National Income Account Identities 
 The market-clearing condition for the final goods is  
(16) ttt ICY += . 
ttt cLC =  is aggregate consumption, and tI  is investment in physical capital. The correct value 
of GDP should include the amount of investment in R&D such that  
(17) trttrttt KRLwYGDP ,, ++= .
36 
                                                 
36 In the national income account, private spending in R&D is treated as an expenditure on intermediate 
goods. Therefore, the values of capital investment and GDP in the data are 
t
I  and 
t
Y  respectively. The 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and the National Science Foundation’s R&D satellite account provides 
preliminary estimates on the effects of including R&D as an intangible asset in the national income 
accounts.  
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trL ,  and trK ,  are respectively the number of workers and the amount of capital in the R&D 
sector that invents new varieties. The amount of monopolistic profits, the factor payments for 
production workers and capital in the intermediate-goods sector are given by  
(18) ttyt YLw )1(, α−= , 
(19) ωα ˆ, ttyt YKR = , 
(20) )ˆ1( ωαωπ −= ttt YV , 
where ]1,[ˆ
.
αηω ∈  is determined by the fraction of monopolistic industries 
.


















A rise in the fraction of monopolistic industries 
.
ω  leads to a decrease in ω̂  and consequently, 
increases the wedge between the marginal product of capital and the rental price. As will be 
shown below, this decrease in ω̂  also leads to a lower rate of investment in physical capital. 
Therefore, ω̂  captures the dynamic distortionary effect of the patent length on capital 
accumulation. 
 
2.6. Capital Accumulation 
 The market-clearing condition for physical capital is  
(22) trtyt KKK ,, += .  
tK  is the total amount of capital available in the economy at time t. The law of motion for capital 
is  
(23) δttt KIK −=&   
δ  is the rate of depreciation. Denote the balanced-growth rate of capital by Kg , the endogenous 
steady-state investment rate is  
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(24) ttK YKgi /)( δ+=   





































In the Romer model, (skilled) labor is the only input for R&D (i.e. 0=Ks ); therefore, the 
distortionary effect of patent length on the rate of investment in capital is unambiguously negative 
(i.e. 0/ <∂∂ Ti ). In the current model with 0≥Ks , there is an opposing positive effect 
operating through Ks . Intuitively, an increase in the patent length raises the private return on 
R&D and hence the share of capital employed in the R&D sector. Proposition 1 in Section 2.11 
shows that the negative effect still dominates. 
 
2.7. R&D 
The no-arbitrage value of a patent trP ,  for a new variety invented at time t is the expected 
present value of the stream of monopolistic profits earned by an R&D entrepreneur until the 























)(  is the present-value discount factor after substituting in (4) for the 
steady-state real interest rate and defining πg  as the balanced-growth rate of monopolistic 
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profits. When 0=πg , the market value of a patent depreciates approximately at an annual rate of 
1/T.37 For example, when the patent length is 20 years and 0=πg , the market value of a patent 
depreciates at roughly 5% per year. However, the empirical estimates from the patent renewal 
data suggest that a reasonable range for the patent-value depreciation rates is between 15% and 
25%; therefore, ]1.0,2.0[ −−∈πg . In other words, an invention loses about 10% to 20% of its 
market share per year on average. The marginal effect of patent length on )(TΩ  given by 
TggceT
)()( πσρ −+−=Ω′  is positive, and this marginal effect depends positively on the profit growth 
rate πg . Therefore, a highly negative profit growth rate (i.e. a high patent-value depreciation 
rate) would render patent extension ineffective in raising the market value of patents. 
 
 The instantaneous probability )(ktλ  of an innovation success for R&D entrepreneur 




ββϕλ −= , 
where tϕ  is the productivity parameter of R&D inputs that the entrepreneurs take as given. This 
specification nests the “knowledge-driven” specification in Romer (1990) as a special case with 
0=β  and the “lab equipment” specification in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Jones and 
Williams (2000) as a special case with αβ = . The R&D sector is characterized by constant 
returns to scale and perfect competition. The amount of expected profit of investing in R&D is  
(29) )()()()( ,,,, kKRkLwkPk trttrtttrtr −−= λπ . 
The first-order conditions for R&D entrepreneur k are  
(30) ttrtrttr wkLkKP =−
βϕβ ))(/)(()1( ,,, ,  
(31) ttrtrttr RkLkKP =
−1
,,, ))(/)((.
βϕβ .  
                                                 
37 This approximation is exact when the interest rate is zero.  
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(30) and (31) together with (18) and (19) determine the resource allocation between production 
and R&D. 
 
2.8. Law of Motion for the Number of Varieties 
To eliminate scale effects and to ensure the existence of a balanced-growth path in the 
presence of population growth, I follow Jones and Williams (2000) to assume that the R&D 




−−= γββφϕϕ trtrtt LKV . 
)1,(−∞∈φ  captures the externality in intertemporal knowledge spillovers,38 and ]1,0(∈γ  
captures the negative externality in intratemporal duplication or the so-called “stepping-on-toes” 
effects. The law of motion for the number of varieties is  
(33) 






−− === ∫ trtrttrtrttt LKVLKdkkV& . 
Along the balanced-growth path, ∫=
1
0
,, )( dkkKK trtr  increases at Kg , and ∫=
1
0
,, )( dkkLL trtr  
increases at the exogenous population growth rate n . Therefore, the balanced-growth rate of tV  














































Finally, the steady-state fraction of patented varieties 
.

















                                                 
38 As discussed in Jones (1995b), )1,0(∈φ  corresponds to the “standing-on-shoulder” effect, in which 
R&D productivity increases as tV  increases, and )0,(−∞∈φ  refers to the “fishing-out” effect, in which 




 is the number of patented varieties at time t and Ttt VV −−
&&  is the net increase in the 
number of patented varieties at time t.  
 
2.9. Decentralized Equilibrium and Balanced-Growth Path 
The analysis starts at 0=t  when the economy has reached the balanced-growth path 
corresponding to the patent length T. The equilibrium is a sequence of allocations 
∞
=0,,,, },,,,,,,),(,,{ ttttrtrtytyttttt LKLKLKIYjXac  and a sequence of prices 
∞
=0, }),(,,,{ ttrtttt PjPRrw  that are consistent with initial conditions },,,,,{ 000000 ϕAVZLK  and 
their subsequent laws of motions. Also, in each period,  
(a) the representative household chooses },{ tt ac  to maximize utility taking },{ tt rw  as 
given;  
(b) the competitive firms in the final-goods sector choose }),({ ,tyt LjX  to maximize profits 
according to the production function taking }),({ tt wjP  as given; 
(c) the monopolistic firms ],0[
. tVj ω∈  in the intermediate-goods sector choose 
)}(),({ , jKjP tyt  to maximize profits according to the demand curve from the final-
goods sector and the production function taking }{ tR  as given;  
(d) the competitive firms ]1,(
.
ω∈′j  in the intermediate-goods sector choose )}({ , jK ty ′  to 
maximize profits according to the production function taking }),({ tt RjP ′  as given;  
(e) the entrepreneurs ]1,0[∈k  in the R&D sector choose )}(),({ ,, kKkL trtr  to maximize 
profits according to the production function taking },,,{ , ttrtt PRw ϕ  as given;  
(f) the market for the final goods clears such that ttt ICY += ; 
(g) the full employment of capital such that trtyt KKK ,, += ; and 
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(h) the full employment of labors such that trtyt LLL ,, += . 
 




















































































The balanced-growth rates of various variables are given as follows. From the aggregate 
production function in (13) and the steady-state investment rate in (26),   
(39) ngggggg ZACIKY ++==== . 
Therefore, ZAc ggg += . From the definition of R&D-driven TFP in (14),   















Finally, from (20), the balanced-growth rate of monopolistic profits is  
(41) VZAVY gnggggg −++=−=π . 
Note that πg  is restricted to equal 0>+ ngZ  when 1=η  because VA gg = . However, when 
η  is large (i.e. a low markup), Vg  becomes large relative to Ag . Therefore, holding Ag  
 54 
constant, an increase in η  leads to a decrease in πg . Eventually, πg  becomes negative for a low 
enough markup.  
 
Denote the fraction of the long-run TFP driven by R&D by ξ  such that 
)1/(
.
αξ −= TFPA gg  and )1/()1( αξ −−= TFPZ gg . If 1=ξ , then the value of πg  is pinned 
down by Ag , α , η  and n  according to (40) and (41). The resulting implied value of πg  could 
be seriously biased due to the misspecification of the model. Therefore, I allow ξ  to differ from 
one and calibrate this parameter from the data. Firstly, I make use of the previous empirical 
estimates for the patent-value depreciation rate to determines πg . Note that once πg  is given, 
(41) pins down a unique value for Vg  for given values of TFPg , α  and n . Then, given Vg , (40) 
pins down a unique value  for Ag  for given values of α  and η .  
 
Finally, from (34) and using (39) and (40), the balanced-growth condition that determines 

































2.10. Socially Optimal Allocations 
To derive the socially optimal rate of capital investment 
*
i  and R&D shares of labor *Ls  
and capital 
*




















subject to: (a) the aggregate production function expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
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(44) 
αααααηαη −−−− −−= 11,,
1/)1( )1()1( tttLtKttt LKssZVY ; 
(b) the law of motion for capital expressed in terms of ti  given by 
(45) δtttt KYiK −=& ;  
and (c) the law of motion for the number of varieties expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
(46) ϕγββγγββγφ )1()1(,, )()(
−−= tttLtKtt LKssVV
& . 
After deriving the first-order conditions, the social planner solves for 
*
i , *Ls  and 
*
Ks  on the 
balanced-growth path.  
 
Lemma 2: The socially optimal rate of capital investment 
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and the socially optimal R&D shares of labor 
*
Ls  and capital 
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Proof: See Appendix E.□ 
 
(48) and (49) indicate the various R&D externalities: (a) the negative externality in intratemporal 
duplication ]1,0(∈γ ; (b) the positive or negative externality in intertemporal knowledge 
spillovers )1,(−∞∈φ ; (c) the positive externality from the dynamic surplus-appropriability 
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problem due to a finite patent length given by 1)1( ))1(( <− +−+−− Tggn Vce σρ ; and finally, (d) the 
positive externality from the static surplus-appropriability problem given by 
ωωαηαη /)ˆ1(/)1( −>−  for all T. Given the existence of positive and negative externalities, it 
requires a careful calibration that will be performed in Section 3 to determine whether the market 
economy over- or under-invests in R&D.  
 
2.11. Dynamic Distortion 
 If the market economy underinvests in R&D, the government may want to increase the 
patent length to reduce the extent of this market failure. However, an increase in T would worsen 
the dynamic distortionary effect on capital accumulation. Therefore, the government needs to 
trade off the gains from the increase in R&D and the losses caused by the dynamic distortion and 
potentially the static distortion. Proposition 1 provides the condition under which the markup-





Proposition 1: The decentralized equilibrium capital investment rate i  is below the socially 
optimal investment rate 
*
i  if either there is underinvestment in R&D or labor is the only factor 
input for R&D. In addition, an increase in the patent length always reduces the equilibrium 
capital investment rate i . 
Proof: See Appendix E.□ 
 
The second part of the proposition is quite intuitive. When the patent length increases, the 
fraction of monopolistic industries rises. The resulting higher aggregate markup drives a bigger 
wedge between the marginal product of capital and the rental price. Therefore, the market 
equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital decreases. As for the first part of the 
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proposition, the discrepancy between the market equilibrium rate of investment in physical 
capital and the social optimum arises because of: (a) the aggregate markup; and (b) the 
discrepancy between the market equilibrium R&D capital share Ks  and the socially optimal 
R&D capital share 
*
Ks . Since the market equilibrium capital investment rate i  is an increasing 
function of Ks , the underinvestment in R&D in the market equilibrium is sufficient for 
*
ii < . On 
the other hand, when there is overinvestment in R&D in the market equilibrium, whether i  is 
below or above 
*
i  depends on whether the effect of the aggregate markup or the effect of R&D 
overinvestment dominates. For the case in which labor is the only factor input for R&D, 0=Ks ; 




This section firstly calibrates the structural and externality parameters using long-run 
aggregate data of the US economy and then computes the changes in R&D and consumption from 
varying the patent length. After that, the dynamic distortionary effects are also examined.  
 
3.1. Structural Parameters 
The statutory patent length T in the US is 20 years, and the average annual labor-force 
growth rate n  is 1.66%.39 The annual discount rate ρ  and the annual rate of depreciation δ  for 
physical capital are set to conventional values of 0.04 and 0.08 respectively. β  is set equal to α  
corresponding to the lab-equipment specification in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Jones 
and Williams (2000).40 Once the above parameters are determined, the model provides five 
                                                 
39 This number is calculated using data between 1956 and 2006 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
40 I have considered different plausible values for }3,2,,0{ αααβ ∈  as a sensitivity analysis, and the 
results are robust to these parameter changes. 
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steady-state conditions (summarized in (50)-(54) below) to match the following five moments in 
the data and to determine the remaining five structural parameters },,,,{ ξηασ Vg . The ratio of 
private investment to GDP is 20.21%,41 and the labor share of total income is set to a 
conventional value of 0.7. The ratio of private spending on R&D to GDP is 1.49%.42, and the 
average annual TFP growth rate ))(1( ZATFP ggg +−= α  is 1.02%.
43  As discussed in Section 
2.7, the empirical estimates based on the patent renewal data suggest that a reasonable range for 
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(54) VTFP gngg −+−= )1/( απ . 































Table III-1 lists the calibrated structural parameters along with the implied markup 
)/(1 αηµ =  and the implied real interest rate σρ Agr += . The implied markup is within the 
                                                 
41 This number is calculated using data between 1956 and 2006 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and 
GDP is net of government spending.  
42 This number is calculated using data between 1956 and 2004 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and 
the National Science Foundation. R&D is net of federal spending, and GDP is net of government spending.  
43 Multifactor productivity for private non-farm business sector from the Bureau of Labor Statistics is 
available from 1956 to 2002.  
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empirically plausible range. For example, Laitner and Stolyarov’s (2004) estimated markup is 
1.09-1.11, and Basu and Fernald (1997) estimate that the aggregate profit share in the US is about 
3%.44 Also, the implied real interest rate is closed to the historical rate of return in the US stock 
market. The calibrated values for ξ  suggest that roughly 35% to 45% of the long-run TFP growth 
in the US is driven by R&D.  
 
3.2. Externality Parameters 
For each set of the calibrated parameters, the balanced-growth condition in (42) 
determines a unique value for )1/( φγ − , which is sufficient to determine the effect of R&D on 
the balanced-growth level of consumption. However, holding )1/( φγ −  constant, a larger γ  
implies a faster rate of convergence to the balanced-growth path; therefore, it is important to 
consider different values for ]0.1,1.0[
.
∈γ  that is the parameter for the negative externality in 
intratemporal duplication. The calibrated values for φ  that is the parameter for the externality in 
intertemporal knowledge spillovers are listed in Table III-2, and the positive values suggest 
positive knowledge spillovers (i.e. the standing-on-shoulder effect). 
 
3.3. Socially Optimal R&D 
This section computes the socially optimal level of R&D share 
)1/()1/()1( ****
. KKLL
ssss −+−− αα . Figure III-1 shows that there is underinvestment in R&D 
unless γ  is very small. To reduce the plausible parameter space for γ , I make use of the 
empirical estimates for the social rate of return to R&D. Following Jones and Williams’ (1998) 
derivation, Appendix F shows that the net social rate of return r~  can be expressed as 
                                                 
44 Assuming cost minimization, the return to scale = markup x (1 - the profit share). Basu and Fernald’s 






































Holding other things constant, r~  is increasing in γ . Table III-3 shows that for the range of 
values for 2.0≤γ  that exhibits R&D underinvestment, the implied social rates of return r~  are 
less than 8%, which are far below the empirical estimates summarized in Jones and Williams 
(1998). Since the empirical estimates for the social rate of return to R&D vary across studies, I 
will leave it to the readers to decide on their preferred values. For the relevant range of γ , there is 
underinvestment in R&D. This finding of R&D underinvestment is due to the calibration result 
that a non-negligible fraction of long-run TFP growth is driven by R&D. In other words, if the 
calibrated values for ξ  were smaller, then the socially optimal levels of R&D spending would be 
lower. This is because a lower calibrated value for ξ  implies a lower calibrated value for 
)1/( φγ − , which in turn implies that R&D would have a smaller effect on consumption. 
 
3.4. Patent Extension 
Given the above finding of R&D underinvestment, a natural question to ask is whether 
extending the patent length can effectively mitigate this problem. Figure III-2 shows that the 
magnitude of the increases in R&D from extending the patent length beyond 20 years depends on 
the patent-value depreciation rate. At a high patent-value depreciation rate, the stimulating effect 
of the patent length on R&D is almost negligible. At a low patent-value depreciation rate, 
extending the patent length from 20 to 50 years increases R&D slightly by 0.2 percentage points, 
and the resulting level of R&D is still far below the social optimum. Therefore, this numerical 
exercise suggests that patent extension is not an effective method in stimulating R&D confirming 
the intuition discussed in Section 2.7. On the other hand, shortening the patent length can reduce 
R&D spending significantly. 
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The next exercise computes the percentage changes in long-run consumption when the 
patent length varies from 20 years.  
 
Lemma 3: For βα = , the expression for the endogenous parts of consumption on the balanced-

















































Proof: See Appendix E.□ 
 
Figure III-3 plots the percentage changes in long-run consumption. Given the small increases in 
R&D from patent extension, the positive effect on long-run consumption is no more than 3% at 
the lower bound of the patent-value depreciation rates and is as small as 0.61% at the upper 









 that is the direct effect of increasing R&D 
spending on consumption. In other words, the other general-equilibrium and distortionary effects 
only have secondary impacts. 
 
3.5. Dynamic Distortion 
Proposition 1 derives the sufficient condition under which the market equilibrium rate of 
investment in physical capital is below the socially optimal level in (47). The next numerical 
exercise quantifies this discrepancy. Figure III-4 presents the socially optimal rates of investment 
in physical capital along with the US’s long-run investment rate, and the difference is about 1.7% 
on average. The equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital is decreasing in the aggregate 
markup; therefore, extending the patent length decreases the capital investment rate and causes it 
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to deviate further from the social optimum. Figure III-5 presents the equilibrium rates of capital 
investment at different patent length. Extending the patent length from 20 to 50 years would 
cause the steady-state equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital to decrease slightly by at 




This chapter provides a quantitative framework to evaluate the effects of extending the 
patent length. At the empirical range of patent-value depreciation rates, extending the patent 
length beyond 20 years leads to only a very small increase in R&D. Therefore, the policy 
implication is that the patent length is not an effective policy instrument in solving the R&D-
underinvestment problem. Although the analysis focuses on the balanced-growth path, taking into 
consideration the transition dynamics should not alter this policy implication. This is because if 
the long-run effects on consumption are so small, accounting for the potential short-run 
consumption losses would make the overall welfare gains even more negligible. The calibration 
exercise also suggests that about 35% to 45% of the long-run TFP growth in the US is driven by 
R&D and extending the patent length would worsen the dynamic distortionary effect slightly by 
reducing the steady-state rate of investment in physical capital by at most 0.24%.  
 
The readers are advised to interpret the numerical results with some important caveats in 
mind. Although the variety-expanding growth model has been generalized to capture more 
realistic features of the US economy, it is still an oversimplification of the real world. 
Furthermore, the finding of R&D underinvestment is based on the assumptions that the empirical 
estimates for the social rate of return to R&D and the data on private R&D spending are not 
incorrectly measured by an order of magnitude. The validity of these assumptions remains as an 
empirical question. Therefore, the numerical results should be viewed as illustrative at best. 
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CHAPTER IV  
Special Interest Politics and Intellectual Property Rights 
 
“What’s true of the eight-hundred-pound gorilla is true of the colossus that is the 
pharmaceutical industry. It is used to doing pretty much what it wants to do.” – 
Marcia Angell (2005, p. 3) 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the 80’s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of 
laws enacted by the Congress, such as the Bayh Dole Act in 1980,45 the Hatch-Waxman Act in 
1984,46 the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992,47 and the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997.48 These policies result in an extension of the commercial lifetime of 
patents for brand-name drugs.49 So, why did the government implement all these policy changes?  
  
At the first glance, the answer could be quite obvious that there must be incentives for the 
policymakers to do so. But, the real puzzle is about what exactly these incentives are. It may be  
                                                 
45 The Bayh-Dole Act essentially allows universities and other non-profit institutions to patent discoveries 
from publicly funded medical research and then to grant exclusive licenses to drug companies. See, e.g. 
Jaffe (2000), Eisenberg (2001) and Angell (2005, chapter 1). 
46 The Hatch-Waxman Act enables drug companies to extend monopoly rights by restoring up to five years 
of lost patent time on premarket testing and the FDA approval process. See, e.g. Eisenberg (2001) and 
Gallini (2002). Also, as a result of this Act, “…if a brand-name company sues a generic company for patent 
infringement, FDA approval of the generic drug will automatically be delayed for [up to] thirty months… 
In effect, the FDA will add thirty months to the brand-name drug’s exclusivity.” Angell (2005, p. 179-180) 
47 The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 authorizes the FDA to collect user fees from the 
pharmaceutical industry and at the same time requires the FDA to significantly reduce its approval time for 
drugs. As a result, the FDA approval time decreases from 2.6 years to 1.4 years, which in turn increases the 
commercial lifetime of patents for drugs. See, e.g. NIHCM (2000). 
48 The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 extends the monopoly rights for a drug 
by six months if it is tested in children. “The result is that drug companies now test their blockbusters, 
including drugs to treat primarily adult diseases like high blood pressure, in children, just because the extra 
protection is so lucrative.” Angell (2005, p. 182) 
49 Refer to Table 2 for details. The commercial lifetime of patent for a drug refers to the number of years 
remaining in the drug’s patent term after clinical testing and FDA’s approval of the drug.  
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the case that the government has the incentives to act as a social planner and to maximize social 
welfare as we, economists, usually like to assume. However, the reality is neither so simple nor 
ideal. Douglass North (2005, p. 67) describes the incentives of the government as, 
“The Government is not a disinterested party in the economy. By the very nature 
of the political process..., the government has strong incentives to behave 
opportunistically to maximize the rents of those with access to the government 
decision-making process... [I]t means that the government will cartelize 
economic activity in favor of politically influential parties. In rare cases the 
government designs and enforces a set of rules of the game that encourage 
productive activity.” 
 
The $200-billion industry not only has access to the government’s decision-making process,50 but 
it is indeed so politically influential that “PhRMA, this lobby, has a death grip on Congress”, in 
the words of Senator Richard J. Durbin.51 This political influence potentially comes from the 
impressive amount of the industry’s lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions. For 
example, the industry’s total expenditure on lobbying from 1998 to 2006 was $1,087 million, and 
total campaign contributions were $139 million during the election cycles from 1990 to 2006.52 In 
fact, given the nature of the industry, it is easy to understand that it is in the drug companies’ best 
interest to have access to the policymakers, who can easily return favors at low political costs. For 
a blockbuster (a drug that has sales of over a billion dollars a year), an extension of the patent’s 
effective lifetime for a few years could be extremely profitable given the usually negligible 
marginal cost of production for drugs.  
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical analysis on this phenomenon by 
taking as a premise the hypothesis that campaign contributions are for the purpose of buying 
                                                 
50 The figure of $200 billion refers only to how much Americans spent on prescription drugs in 2002, and it 
does not include the other large expenses on drugs administered in hospitals, nursing homes, or doctors’ 
offices. Combining all these expenses, the industry’s revenue is roughly $400 billions in 2002. See, e.g. 
Angell (2005, p. 4-5). 
51 Robert Pear, “Drug Companies Increase Spending on Efforts to Lobby Congress and Governments” New 
York Times, June 1, 2003. 
52 These two figures are quoted in nominal terms. Refer to Table 1 for the detailed breakdown in real terms.  
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legislative influence. In particular, it incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder 
growth model to analyze the political-economic tradeoff facing the policymakers, who have to 
balance between the optimal level of patent protection to maximize social welfare on one hand 
and the interests of the SIG in exchange for campaign contributions on the other.53 It is 
analytically shown that the government placing a higher value on campaign contributions 
increases: (a) the patent length; (b) the amount of monopolistic profits; (c) the market value of 
patents; and (d) R&D investments. These results are consistent with the data in Section 2. 
Furthermore, this chapter derives a unique level of the government’s bargaining power above 
which the amount of campaign contributions increases with respect to the weight that the 
government places on campaign contributions.  
 
In terms of welfare implications, it is not surprising and perhaps trivial that the presence 
of a SIG lobbying the government to distort the level of patent protection is socially undesirable 
in a closed-economy setting. However, in a symmetric multi-country setting, the presence of a 
SIG lobbying its own government may improve social welfare in each country because the level 
of patent protection in the multi-country Nash equilibrium without lobbying is suboptimally low 
due to the positive externality of international spillovers in innovation suggested by previous 
studies, such as Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003). Therefore, the multi-country 
political equilibrium features an additional efficiency tradeoff between monopolistic distortion 
and the detrimental effects of international free-riding on innovations, and the finding of potential 
welfare gains arises from the SIGs increasing the level of patent protection from a globally 
suboptimal level and acting as an externality-correcting device. In addition, the pharmaceutical 
lobby may even improve the welfare of the consumers, who do not own any patent, when the 
                                                 
53 This setup is motivated by Grossman and Helpman’s (2002, p. 5) insight that “[p]oliticians value 
contributions for their potential usefulness in financing campaigns, but many also wish to enact policies 
that benefit the public in order to improve their popularity among the well informed or to fulfill their sense 
of social responsibility.” 
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degree of international free-riding on innovations is severe enough. Finally, this chapter shows 
that if the SIGs have asymmetric influences across countries, then the country, in which the 
government places a higher value on campaign contributions, would gain by less or even suffer a 
welfare loss.  
 
 This chapter relates to four strands of literature: (a) political economy of trade policy, (b) 
political economy and economic growth; (c) the welfare effects of lobbying; and (d) international 
patent protection. Feenstra (2004, chapter 9) provides a comprehensive discussion on the political 
economy of trade policy. An elegant formulation of special interest politics and trade policy is 
provided by Grossman and Helpman (1994), who later develop a set of modeling tools on special 
interest politics in Grossman and Helpman (2001), from which this chapter borrows to analyze 
patent policy. Drazen (2000, chapter 11) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 14) provide a 
comprehensive discussion on political economy and economic growth. The literature has so far 
focused on the relations between economic growth and a number of issues, such as income 
inequality through redistributive policies, political institutions through property rights, and the 
adoption of new technology through the distribution of technological-vintage-specific human 
capital. This chapter provides a theoretical analysis on economic growth and the political 
economy of patent policy on one hand and analyzes the welfare effects of lobbying on the other. 
Recent studies on the welfare effects of lobbying, such as Besley and Coate (2001) and Coate and 
Morris (1999), analyze the negative effects of lobbying on social welfare arising from 
coordination failures between multiple SIGs, the excessive entry of citizens into running for 
office, and the implementation of Pareto dominated policies due to the fear of lobbying-driven 
hysteresis in policy decisions.  
 
 In the literature on international patent protection, Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and 
Qiu (2003) analyze the welfare effects of strengthening patent protection in developing countries 
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as a result of the TRIPS agreement using a multi-country variety-expanding growth model. In 
contrast, the current chapter develops a multi-country quality-ladder growth model to analyze 
international patent protection and the political-economy aspects of patent policy. Dinopoulous et 
al (2005) analyze international patent protection using a North-South quality-ladder model. In 
their model, the level of patent protection is an exogenous parameter, and they are interested in 
the effects of patent protection on long-run growth and technology transfer; on the other hand, in 
the current chapter, the level of patent protection is a policy instrument chosen by the government 
to maximize its objective function. Furthermore, the current chapter incorporates special interest 
politics into the growth model to analyze the welfare implications of a pharmaceutical lobby. Lai 
(2005) extends the variety-expanding model in Grossman and Lai (2004) to analyze the effects of 
political contributions on the level of patent protection and shows insufficient patent protection 
prior to the TRIPS agreement. The current chapter complements and extends Lai (2005) by taking 
insufficient patent protection as a starting point and by investigating whether the increasing 
political influence of the pharmaceutical lobby has improved social welfare. In addition, the 
current chapter considers the welfare implications under both symmetric and asymmetric SIGs. 
 
 Before closing the introduction, I briefly discuss two common critiques against the 
hypothesis of campaign contributions as political investments. The first one is the small amount 
of campaign contributions relative to the potential financial returns at stake. Helpman and Persson 
(2001) provide an interesting model to show that a small amount of contributions does not 
necessarily imply that it has no effects on policy outcomes. In their model, lobbying has 
important influences on policy outcomes and the equilibrium amount of contributions is as small 
as zero because of the competition between legislators. The other common critique is that 
individuals are the main source of money in US campaigns. Based on this observation, 
Ansolabehere et al (2003) argue that campaign contributions should be considered as 
consumption goods rather than political investments. However, this argument does not rule out 
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the possibility that SIGs contribute in order to influence the policymakers on certain policies. 
Ansolabehere et al (2003) write, “[a]lthough aggregate campaign expenditures primarily reflect 
consumption, it may be that a subset of donors, mainly corporate and industry PACs, behave as if 
they expected favors in return. These contributors may in fact receive a reasonable rate of return – 
say 20 percent…”  
 
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some stylized facts 
about the pharmaceutical industry. Section 3 describes the model and presents the theoretical 
results. The final section concludes. Some of the proofs are contained in Appendix H. 
 
 
2. Some Stylized Facts about the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Table IV-1 indicates that the industry spends a large amount of money on lobbying each 
year and on campaign contributions during each election cycle. Another feature of the data is that 
lobbying expenditures in real terms have been rising rapidly at an average annual growth rate of 
9.96%. Proposition 2 suggests that this rising trend may be interpreted as an indication for the 
increasing importance of lobbying and campaign contributions that motivate the comparative 
static exercise in Section 3. 
 
Table IV-2 presents the details of the extension in the commercial lifetime of patent and 
market exclusivity for drugs as a result of the policy changes during the 80’s and 90’s. Note that 
the effects captured in Table IV-2 underestimates the true extension of monopoly rights for 
brand-name drugs because they do not take into account the fact that the companies could 
strategically utilize the market exclusivity provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act to protect a new 
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generation of slightly-modified products.54 To summarize, the data presented so far is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the pharmaceutical industry has successfully exercised its political 
power, which comes from lobbying and campaign contributions, to influence the policymakers in 
order to strengthen patent protection for brand-name drugs. The next question is whether these 
policy changes have led to handsome financial returns for the industry. 
 
 Indeed, they have. As Angell (2005, p. 3) writes, “[t]he watershed year was 1980. Before 
then, it was a good business, but afterward, it was a stupendous one.” Table IV-4 presents some 
financial time series for the top 10 pharmaceutical companies in Fortune 500 as an example. Each 
number in the table represents the annual average of the combined figures of the companies; for 
example, the first row presents the annual averages of the combined sales of the companies in the 
past decades. The data indicates that both sales and pretax income have been rising at a faster rate 
than the real GDP. Also, as a result of the stronger patent protection, the market value of 
pharmaceutical patents should have increased as well. A rough proxy for the value of patents 
owned by the companies is the value of intangible assets,55 which has also risen substantially.  
 
 Motivated by the data presented above, the theoretical model in Section 3 attempts to 
achieve the following analytical results to confirm the basic intuition of the model. An increase in 
the value that the government places on campaign contributions in its objective function should 
lead to an extension in the patent length for brand-name drugs, and consequently an increase in 
the amount of monopolistic profits generated by the industry and the market value of patents. In 
addition, the model predicts that R&D investments on pharmaceuticals would increase. Table IV-
                                                 
54 From NIHCM (2000), “…if a manufacturer timed the introduction of a new use, such as a more 
convenient dosing form, to coincide with the expiration of the ‘mother’ drug’s patent, it could have 
shielded the 13.9 to 15.4 years franchise of the drug for an additional three years, for as long as 17 to 18 
years overall.” 
55 This proxy is a rough approximation at best for two reasons: (a) it includes other items, such as trade 
secrets, trademarks, and goodwill; and (b) the accounting valuation methods may not accurately reflect the 
market value. 
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4 shows that this is also true in the data. Private R&D spending on drugs in real terms has been 
increasing at an average annual growth rate of 7.28% since the 80’s. 
 
 
3. A Quality-Ladder Growth Model with Special Interest Politics 
The quality-ladder growth model originates from Aghion and Howitt (1992) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), in which scale effects are eliminated by assuming decreasing 
individual R&D productivity as in Segerstrom (1998).56 The basic framework is modified to 
introduce: (a) patent protection in the form of patent length; and (b) an organized SIG 
representing the owners of pharmaceutical patents. The model is further modified to include 
homogenous goods and quality-enhancing goods (i.e. pharmaceuticals).  
 
 Sections 3.1 – 3.4 firstly describe the different components of the model in a closed-
economy setting, and then the decentralized equilibrium is defined in Section 3.5. After 
characterizing the socially optimal patent length, lobbying is incorporated into the model by 
assuming that the government values campaign contributions in addition to social welfare. As a 
result, the SIG is able to distort the level of patent protection to benefit itself. The comparative 
static result shows that an increase in the importance of campaign contributions in the 
government’s objective function increases: (a) the patent length; (b) the amount of monopolistic 
profits; (c) the market value of patents; and (d) R&D investments. Finally, the different welfare 
implications of lobbying are derived under the closed-economy and multi-country settings with 
symmetric and asymmetric SIGs.  
 
                                                 
56 See, e.g. Jones (1995a) and Jones (1999) for a discussion of scales effects in R&D-driven endogenous 
growth models. After eliminating scale effects, the resulting model becomes the so-called semi-endogenous 
growth model, in which the growth rate along the balanced-growth path is proportional to the labor-force 
growth rate. An increase in the share of R&D workers raises the level of technology while holding its 
balanced-growth rate constant. 
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3.1. Households 
 There is a continuum of households indexed by ]1,0[∈i , and their lifetime utility 








)(, ic th  is the per capita consumption of homogenous goods, and it is chosen as the numeraire. β  
is a preference parameter reflecting the importance of the per capita consumption of quality-
enhancing goods, denoted by )(, ic tq . Each household has 
tn
t eL
.=  members at time t, and 
0>n  is the exogenous population growth rate. ρ  is the subjective discount rate. To ensure that 
utility is bounded,  
(a1) n>ρ . 
Each household maximizes utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints  
(2) )()()()()( ,,, icPicwianria tqtqthtttt −−+−=& . 
Each member of a household inelastically supplies one unit of homogenous labor in each period 
to earn a wage income tw . tr  is the real rate of return on the financial assets, which represent the 
market value of patents in equilibrium. Each household ]1,0[∈i  belongs to either of two types 
},{ III∈ . Type-I household ],0[ θ∈i  and Type-II household ]1,(θ∈i  differ in their investment 
opportunity sets.  
 
Assumption 1: Type-I households have access to the financial market while Type-II households 
are restricted from participating in the financial market such that 0)( =IIat .
58
 
                                                 
57 The quasi-linear preference enables me to derive the patent length in the political equilibrium with a 
minimal assumption of efficient bargaining between the government and the SIG. 
58 In this setting, the identity of the two types of households is exogenously imposed. In fact, this identity 
can be endogenously derived by assuming an exogenous difference in the discount rates across the two 
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This setup leads to a conflict of interest between the patent owners (i.e. Type-I households) who 
benefit from an increase in the rate of return on R&D investments and the consumers (i.e. Type-II 
households) who don’t, and this conflict of interest gives rise to the importance of political 
economics. 
 
 From Type-I households’ intertemporal optimization, the Euler equation derived from the 
quasi-linear preference equates the rate of return on financial assets to the subjective discount rate 
such that  
(3) ρ=tr . 
The intratemporal optimality condition determines the amount of spending on the quality-
enhancing goods in each period to be  
(4) β=)(,, icP tqtq . 
for },{ IIIi ∈ . Since both types of households consume the same amount of quality-enhancing 
goods, notation simplifies to )(,, icc tqtq ≡ . Aggregate consumption of pharmaceuticals 
tqttq cLC ,, =  is a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator of a continuum of differentiated quality-
enhancing intermediate goods ]1,0[∈j  (i.e. differentiated drugs). The production function is 












,, )(lnexp djjYY tqtq , 












,, )(lnexp djjPP tqtq . 
The first-order condition for differentiated drug ]1,0[∈j  is 
                                                                                                                                                 
types of households along with a borrowing constraint. Then, the households who have a lower discount 
rate would be the owners of financial assets in equilibrium.  
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(7) tqtqtqtq CPjYjP ,,,, )()( = . 
 
3.2. Homogenous Goods 
There exists a larger number of competitive firms producing the homogenous goods thY , . 
The production function has constant returns to scale in labor input thL ,  given by   
(8) thth LY ,, .α= . 
The marginal cost of production is  
(9) α/, tth wMC = . 
Since the homogenous goods are chosen to be the numeraire and this sector is characterized by 
marginal-cost pricing, the marginal cost is also one. Therefore, the real wage is given by α=tw , 
and the market-clearing condition is  
(10) ))()1()(( ,,,, . IIcIcLCY ththtthth θθ −+== , 
where thC ,  is the total consumption of homogenous goods.  
 
3.3. The Pharmaceutical Industry 
Within the pharmaceutical industry, there is a continuum of sub-industries on the unit 
interval producing differentiated drugs. Each sub-industry ],0[ tj ω∈  is dominated by a 
temporary monopolistic leader, who holds a valid patent on the latest technology, and each sub-
industry ]1,(
.tj ω∈  is characterized by perfect competition because the most recent patent has 
expired. tω  is endogenously determined by the patent length chosen by the government. The 
following formulation of patent length is originally developed by Grossman and Lai (2004) for a 
variety-expanding model and subsequently modified by Dinopoulos et al (2005) for a quality-
ladder model. In standard quality-ladder models, a patent’s effective lifetime ends when a higher 
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level of technology is invented in the same industry. As in Dinopoulos et al (2005), I assume that 
a monopolistic leader can maintain its monopoly position until the end of the statutory patent life, 
denoted by T . This assumption is especially relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, in which 
the effective patent life for drugs usually coincides with the statutory patent life.59 
 
Assumption 2: Entrepreneurs can only invest in R&D to develop a better drug after the latest 
patent in the sub-industry has expired. 
 
 When a patent expires, the monopolistic sub-industry temporarily becomes a generic sub-
industry characterized by marginal-cost pricing until the next innovation occurs. Therefore, 
extending the statutory patent life has two opposing effects on social welfare. On one hand, it 
enhances the incentives for R&D by raising the present value of the stream of profits earned by a 
monopolistic leader. On the other hand, it increases the dead weight loss by increasing the 
fraction of monopolistic sub-industries due to a longer period of patent protection. At the 
constrained social optimum, the government balances these opposing effects to maximize social 
welfare.  
 







)(, jL tq  is the number of workers hired by sub-industry j at time t. 
)( jmtz  is the monopolistic 
leader’s marginal product of labor, which is increasing over time due to technological 
improvement. 1>z  is the exogenous step-size of productivity improvement arising from each 
                                                 
59 In this case, the statutory patent life refers to the patent length granted by the US Patent and Trademark 
Office as well as the length of exclusive marketing rights granted by the FDA. 
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innovation. )( jmt , which is an integer, is the number of innovations that has occurred in sub-






tzwjMC = . 
For a monopolistic sub-industry ],0[
. t
j ω∈ , the price-setting behavior is governed by the closest 
rival’s marginal cost of production 
1)(/ −jmt






tzzjMCzjP α== . 
Thus, the monopolistic leader charges a markup of z  over the marginal cost, and the equilibrium 
profit is 
(14) )()1()()()1()( ,,,, . jLzjYjMCzj tqtqtqtq απ −=−= . 
In equilibrium, )(, jL tq  is the same across ],0[ tj ω∈  because of the Cobb-Douglas specification 
in (5), so that )(, jtqπ  is also the same across ],0[ tj ω∈ . 
 
 Substituting (11) into (5), the aggregate production function for pharmaceuticals becomes  
(15) 
e












,, )(lnexp djjLL tq
e













is the aggregate level of technology for pharmaceuticals. Without loss of generality, the sub-
industries are ordered such that j is monopolistic for ],0[ tj ω∈  and j′  is generic for 
]1,(




                                                 
60 This index is different from the actual number of workers in the pharmaceutical industry because the 
number of workers varies across sub-industries in the present model as a result of the presence of both 
monopolistic and generic sub-industries. 
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tqC ,  decreases in tω  reflecting the markup-pricing distortion and increases over time due to tA  





tq = . The first-order condition from (7) implies that the ratio of relative 
labor inputs in the monopolistic and generic sub-industries is zjLjL tqtq =′ )(/)( ,, . Therefore, 





tω−= , and the number of 
workers in monopolistic sub-industry j is )/()(
., αβ zLjL ttq = . Substituting this condition into 














which is the same across all monopolistic sub-industries and increases over time as the total 


















== ∫ . 
























The no-arbitrage value of a pharmaceutical patent tV  for a new successful innovation at 
time t  is the present value of the stream of profits earned by the R&D entrepreneur who becomes 
































where ))(exp(1)( TnT −−−≡Ω ρ  has the properties of 0)0( =Ω , 1)( =∞Ω , and 0)( >Ω′ T .  
  
The Poisson arrival rate )(ktλ  of a successful innovation for an R&D entrepreneur 
]1,0[∈k  is a function of labor inputs given by  
(22) )()( , kLk trtt ϕλ = , 
where tϕ  is the individual R&D productivity parameter that the entrepreneur takes as given. The 
R&D sector is characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect competition. The expected 
profit earned by entrepreneur k is  
(23) )()()( ,, kLwkVk trttttr −= λπ . 
The first-order condition is  
(24) αϕ =ttV , 
which is the key condition that determines the number workers allocated to the R&D sector. 
 
To eliminate scale effects, the individual R&D productivity parameter tϕ  at time t  is 





















,, )( dkkLL trtr . )1,(−∞∈φ  captures the externality of intertemporal knowledge 
spillovers,61 and ]1,0(∈γ  captures the intratemporal negative congestion externality or the so-
called “stepping-on-toes” effects. The law of motion for pharmaceutical technology is  
(26) zLAzLAzAA trttrttttt lnlnln ,, ϕϕλ
γφ===& .62 
 
3.5. Decentralized Equilibrium 
The equilibrium is a sequence of prices 
∞
=0,, )}(),(,,,{ ttqtqttt jMCjPVrw  and a sequence 
of allocations 
∞
=0,,,,,, }),(),(),(),(),(),({ tthtrtqtqtqtht LkLjLjYicicIa  that are consistent with the 
initial conditions },,{ 000 ϕAL  and their subsequent laws of motions. Also,  
(a) each Type-I household chooses )}(),(),({ ,, IcIcIa tqtht  and supplies labor to maximize 
utility taking )}(,,{ , jPrw tqtt  as given;  
(b) each Type-II household chooses )}(),({ ,, IIcIIc tqth  and supplies labor to maximize 
utility taking )}(,{ , jPw tqt  as given;  
(c) competitive firms in the homogenous-goods sector chooses }{ ,thL  to maximize profits 
according to the production function taking }{ tw  as given; 
                                                 
61 As discussed in Jones (1995b), )1,0(∈φ  corresponds to the “standing-on-shoulder” effect, in which 
aggregate R&D productivity ϕqA  increases as the level of technology increases (see the law of motion for 
technology). On the other hand, )0,(−∞∈φ  corresponds to the “fishing-out” effect, in which early 
technology is relatively easy to develop and ϕqA  decreases as the level of technology increases.  


























∫=∫=∫= ττλ ; then, 
differentiation with respect to time yields zAA
ttt
ln/ λ=& . 
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(d) each monopolistic leader in pharmaceutical sub-industry ],0[ tj ω∈  chooses 
)}(),({ ,, jLjP tqtq  to maximize profits according to the Bertrand price competition and its 
production function taking )}(),({ ,, jYjMC tqtq  as given;  
(e) competitive firms in pharmaceutical sub-industry ]1,(
.tj ω∈′  choose )}({ , jL tq ′  to 
maximize profits according to the production function taking 
)}(),(),({ ,,, jYjMCjP tqtqtq ′′′  as given;  
(f) each entrepreneur ]1,0[∈k  in the R&D sector chooses )}({ , kL tr  to maximize profits 
according to the production function taking },,{ ttt Vw ϕ  as given;  
(g) The market for the homogenous goods clears such that thth CY ,, = ; 
(h) The market for pharmaceuticals clears such that tqtq CY ,, = ; and 
(i) The labor market clears such that ttrtqth LLLL =++ ,,, . 
 
3.6. Balanced-Growth Path 
 Along the balanced-growth path, trL ,  increases at the population growth rate (to be shown 
below). Therefore, the balanced-growth rate of technology for pharmaceuticals denoted by g  
























Then, the steady-state Poisson arrival rate of innovations is zg ln/=λ . The fraction of 
monopolistic sub-industries at time t is the sum of all inventions from the last T periods  






Therefore, the steady-state value of 
.
ω  is simply λT . To ensure that ]1,0(
.













is imposed on the patent length.  
  
Solving the first-order condition (24) from the R&D sector and imposing the balanced-





















Substituting (20) and (29) into 1=++ rqh sss  closes the model by solving for the steady-state 

























































































(33) βα −=−= qqh cPwIIc )( . 
Therefore, the following parameter restriction is sufficient to ensure an interior solution for both 
types of households 
(a3) βα > . 
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)()( Ian−ρ  is the amount of dividends received by each member of Type-I households, and the 
total value of financial assets owned by Type-I households equals the market value of all existing 
patents. From (21), the market value of a pharmaceutical patent that has a remaining life time of 






















































































.   
  
To see the conflict of interests across the two types of households, differentiating )(Ich  






































Note that ))()(exp()( nTnT −−−=Ω′ ρρ . An increase in T has three effects on the welfare of 
each household. (36) and (37) indicate the asymmetric effect coming from the increase in the 
value of patents that benefits only the patent owners. The two symmetric effects as shown in (17) 
are the negative effect of markup-pricing distortion and the positive effect of a higher level of 




3.7. Desired Patent Lengths for patent owners and consumers 
Given the equilibrium conditions, the lifetime utility for each type of households along 




















for },{ IIIi ∈ . ),( TIch  is a function of T because an increase in patent length raises the value 
of dividends that increases the consumption of the patent owners. From (17),  
(39) )/ln(ln)(ln)(ln 00, αβλ +−= zTTATcq . 
zT lnλ  is a function of T  because an increase in T worsens the markup-pricing distortion by 
increasing the fraction of monopolistic sub-industries. )(ln 0 TA  is a function of T because an 
increase in T enhances the incentives for R&D, which in turn raises the level of technology for 




























 represents the balanced growth path of tA  and is independent of T because of 
the semi-endogenous growth formulation. Substituting (29), (39) and (40) into (38) and dropping 























for },{ IIIi ∈ . Therefore, the first-order condition that characterizes the desired patent length is 
                                                 
















































III TT > . 











TIc hh  from (36) and (37).□               
 
Intuitively, the patent owners have a longer desired patent length than the consumers because of 
the asymmetric ownership of patents as financial assets whose market value increases in patent 
length. This setup leads to a conflict of interest across the two types of households and gives rise 
to the potential role of the pharmaceutical lobby influencing the government’s policy choice 
through campaign contributions. 
 
3.8. Optimal Patent Length 
A benevolent government chooses the patent length to maximize social welfare subject to 





TIIUTIUdiTiUTW θθ −+=≡ ∫ . 





















Denote the solution to (44) by 




























































































To ensure that the second-order condition is satisfied for a maximum, the following assumption is 


















This assumption rules out the possibility that an increase in T  would increase ),( TIch  by so 
much that 
*T  is unbounded. Comparing with (42), (44) is simply a weighted average of the first-
order conditions for the two types of households. The larger is θ , the closer *T  is to *IT , and 
vice versa. Lemma 2 summarizes these findings.  
 
Lemma 2: ),( *** III TTT ∈  and 0/
* >∂∂ θT  for )1,0(∈θ . 
Proof: Note (42) and (44).□               
 
3.9. Campaign Contributions 
 This subsection employs the modeling tools in Grossman and Helpman (2001, chapter 7) 
to model campaign contributions for legislative influence. In addition to social welfare, the 
government is assumed to value campaign contributions, denoted by 0C , and its objective 
function is a weighted average of )(TW  and 0C  given by  
(47) 00 .)()1(),(
~
CTWCTW ςς +−≡ .64 
]1,0(∈ς  is the weight that the government places on campaign contributions. The 
pharmaceutical lobby and the government are assumed to engage in efficient bargaining and be 
able to commit to the bargaining outcome on patent length and campaign contributions. The 
                                                 
64 Grossman and Helpman (2001, chapter 10) and (2002, chapter 2) show that this objective function 
represents a proper reduced form of a model with electoral competition. 
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quasi-linear preference enables me to derive the political-equilibrium patent length without 
imposing further assumptions on the bargaining process.65 The efficient bargaining outcome on 







subject to UCTIU ˆ),( 0. ≥−θ  for some value of Û . It is in the government’s best interest to 
choose the highest possible 0C  to make this inequality constraint binding. Therefore, the 
constraint can be re-expressed as  
(48) UTIUC ˆ),(.0 −= θ . 







θςθ −−+= . 
In other words, when the government values campaign contributions, the pharmaceutical lobby is 
able to alter the relative weight that the government places on the households’ welfare. In 
particular, a higher value that the government places on campaign contributions leads to a larger 
relative weight that the government places on Type-I households’ welfare. The first-order 






















Comparing (44) and (50), 
*)( TT SIG >ς  for ]1,0(∈ς  and 0/)( >∂∂ ςςSIGT . As the 
government places a larger weight on campaign contributions, it chooses a longer patent length. 
As a result, the amount of monopolistic profits generated by the pharmaceutical industry and the 
value of pharmaceutical patents also increase. This leads to an increase in R&D investments, 
                                                 
65 Although the political-equilibrium patent length can be determined, the amount of campaign 
contributions cannot be determined unless further assumptions are imposed on the bargaining process. See 
Proposition 2. 
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reflected by an increase in the fraction of workers in the R&D sector. Proposition 1 summarizes 
these results. 
 
Proposition 1: An increase in ς  leads to an increase in: (a) SIGT ; (b) qπ ; (c) V ; and (d) rs . 
Proof: For (a), note (50). Then, recall from (28) that 0/ >=∂∂ λω T . For (b), note (19). For (c), 
note (21). For (d), note (29).□         
 
Determining the impact of ς  on the equilibrium amount of campaign contributions 
requires an additional assumption on the bargaining outcome between the government and the 
pharmaceutical lobby.  
 
Assumption 3: The government and the pharmaceutical lobby maximizes the total surplus, and 
the constant share of total surplus captured by the government is ]1,0[∈σ .  
 
Proposition 2: There exists a )1,0(ˆ ∈σ  such that if and only if σσ ˆ≥ , 0/0 ≥∂∂ ςC  for 
)1,0(∈ς . 
Proof: See Appendix H.□     
 
Corollary 1a: The government having the first-mover advantage to make a take-or-leave-it offer 
to the SIG is equivalent to 1=σ . In this case, )),(),(( *0 TIUTIUC
SIG −= θ  and 0/0 >∂∂ ςC  
for )1,0(∈ς .  
Proof: See Appendix H.□       
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Corollary 1b: The SIG having the first-mover advantage to make a take-or-leave-it offer to the 
government is equivalent to 0=σ . In this case, ςς /)1))(()(( *0 −−=
SIG
TWTWC  and 
0/
.0 <∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς .  
Proof: See Appendix H.□         
 
Intuitively, whether the amount of campaign contributions increases or decreases in response to a 
larger ς  depends on the relative bargaining power between the government and the SIG. When 
the government has all the bargaining power (i.e. 1=σ ), it is able to extract all the surplus from 
the SIG, and hence, 0/0 >∂∂ ςC . Similarly, when the SIG has all the bargaining power (i.e. 
0=σ ), it contributes the smallest amount possible in order to make the government indifferent 
between 
SIGT  and *T . 
 
3.10. Welfare Analysis in Closed vs. Open Economy 
Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003) show that the Nash-equilibrium level 
of patent protection in a multi-country setting is suboptimally low because each country has the 
incentive to free ride on other countries’ innovations. Therefore, when all countries act according 
to their best response functions in choosing the level of patent protection, the Nash-equilibrium 
patent length is much shorter than the global optimum. This is a realistic description of the real 
world because innovations occur worldwide. At least, innovations come from multiple industrial 
countries. Therefore, the closed-economy setting is now extended to a multi-country setting in 
order to compare the different welfare implications. The theoretical result is that the 
pharmaceutical lobbies may improve social welfare in the multi-country setting by increasing the 
patent length from a globally suboptimal level. 
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There are N symmetric countries. For simplicity, transportation costs are assumed to be 
zero, and there is no international lending and borrowing as commonly assumed in the literature 
to pin down a unique trade pattern. When an R&D entrepreneur has an innovation success, she 
obtains a patent in each country. Therefore, in addition to the stream of monopolistic profits from 
the domestic economy, she is also entitled to the profits from abroad. At the aggregate level, these 
transfers of monopolistic profits for patent services are balanced by an equal value of trade in 
homogenous goods. The symmetry assumption implies that each country owns an equal fraction 
of patented innovations in the world.  
 
 The two equilibrium concepts for the open-economy model are as follows.  
 
1. Nash Equilibrium. In the absence of lobbying, the benevolent government in each country 
chooses the patent length to maximize the welfare of its own citizens taking the level of patent 
protection abroad as given. The resulting first-order condition for each country },...,1{ Ns ∈  is 



























(i.e. the multi-country analog of (44)), and the Nash equilibrium is the solution of the social best 
response functions of all countries.  
 
2. Political Equilibrium. In the presence of lobbying, the SIG in each country is assumed to 
lobby its own government taking the action of the SIGs in other countries as given. The resulting 





























(i.e. the multi-country analog of (50)), and the political equilibrium is the solution of the SIG best 
response functions of all countries. 
 
 The followings sketch out the key equations of the multi-country model. The no-arbitrage 
value of a patent is the present value of the stream of monopolistic profits from all countries 


























































The statutory patent length in country s is denoted by 
sT . In the Nash equilibrium, sT  is the 
















The first implicit assumption behind (54) is that each country has the immediate access to the 
technological innovations from abroad, and this is a reasonable assumption because the inventors 
have the incentive to patent their innovations internationally. The second assumption is that 
technological innovations across countries are perfect substitutes because of the identical 
households’ preferences across countries, and this is likely to be a reasonable description of the 
demand for pharmaceuticals in industrial countries. The first-order condition from the R&D 









































































(55) and (56) reveal one of the two key differences between the closed-economy model and the 
multi-country model in which a unilateral increase in 
sT  leads to a much smaller percentage 









 and consequently a much smaller percentage increase in 
),...,( 10
N












































































The derivative of ),...,,( 1 Nsh TTIc  with respect to 

































which reveals the other key difference that an unilateral increase in 
sT  has a smaller impact on 
domestic consumption because a large fraction of the increase in monopolistic profits is accrued 
to foreigners.  
 




































By imposing symmetry, the condition that characterizes the symmetric Nash-equilibrium patent 
length 






























Lemma 3: The Nash-equilibrium patent length is decreasing in N and is strictly below the 
symmetric globally optimal patent length when the number of countries is at least two. 
Proof: See Appendix H.□    
 
In the case of special interest politics, the SIG best response function (52) of country 





































The condition that characterizes the symmetric political-equilibrium patent length 


































Proposition 3: When 1=N , )()( *TWTW SIG <   for ]1,0(∈ς . When 2≥N , there exists a ς̂  
such that for ]ˆ,0( ςς ∈ , )()( NEsSIGs TWTW > , and ς̂  is increasing in N . Furthermore, for 
any given )1,0(~ ∈ς , there exists a N
~
 such that if NN
~
≥ , ),(),( NEsSIGs TIIUTIIU > . 
Proof: See Appendix H.□       
 
In a closed-economy setting, the pharmaceutical lobby distorts the level of patent protection from 
the social optimum and thus leads to lower social welfare. However, in a multi-country Nash 
equilibrium, the level of patent protection is suboptimally low; therefore, the pharmaceutical 
lobbies may indeed improve global welfare by increasing the patent length from a suboptimal 
level. This is especially likely when their political influence is not overly substantial. Figure IV-1 
illustrates this intuition in a two-country setting. As the number of countries increases, the degree 
of international free-riding on innovations becomes more severe; as a result, the threshold on the 
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level of the SIGs’ political influence that corresponds to welfare improvement increases. 
Furthermore, even the welfare of the consumers (i.e. Type-II households) may be improved when 
the degree of international free-riding on innovations is severe enough.  
 
 Proposition 3 shows that in a multi-country setting, the presence of a symmetric SIG may 
improve the social welfare of each country. However, if the SIGs have asymmetric influences 
across countries, then the country, in which the government places a higher value on campaign 
contributions, would gain by less or even suffer a welfare loss compared to the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. Proposition 4 proves this statement in a two-country setting.  
 
Proposition 4: Suppose that at the symmetric political equilibrium with 021 >== ςςς
)
, both 
countries are better off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then, there must exist a 
),0( ςς
)(
∈  such that when ςς
)
=1  and ],0[2 ςς
(
∈ , country 1 is worse off compared to the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: See Appendix H.□       
 
Intuitively, if the SIG in country 1 is more politically influential than the SIG in country 2, then 
the patent length in country 1 would be longer than in country 2 in the political equilibrium. In 
this case, country 1 bears a disproportional share of the distortionary effect, and the resulting 




Since the 80’s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of 
policy changes that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of 
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the industry’s political influence, which potentially comes from lobbying and campaign 
contributions. This chapter incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder growth 
model to analyze the policymakers’ tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and 
campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical 
lobby distorting the level of patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting. 
However, in a multi-country setting, the presence of a symmetric SIG may improve the social 
welfare of each country. If the SIGs have asymmetric influences across countries, then the 
country that has a more politically influential SIG would gain by less or even suffer a welfare 
loss. It remains as an empirical question as to whether the pharmaceutical lobby in the US is more 
or less politically influential than its foreign counterparts. 
  
Before closing the chapter, I briefly discuss the generality of the steady-state welfare 
analysis. The transition dynamics is omitted for analytical tractability; however, the theoretical 
predictions should be robust for two reasons. Firstly, the government may want to maximize 
social welfare that includes the transition dynamics. So long as there is a positive externality in 
patent protection, the Nash-equilibrium patent length is globally suboptimal. Thus, an increase in 
patent length due to political influences may still improve social welfare. Secondly, the resource 
reallocation from production to R&D as a result of increasing patent protection does not 
necessarily lead to short-run consumption losses.66 In this case, improving steady-state welfare 
would be sufficient to improve social welfare.  
                                                 






In the long run, economic growth is driven by technological innovations, which partly 
result from profit-seeking entrepreneurial activities such as investments in R&D. In this 
dissertation, I develop quantitative frameworks to analyze the effects of patent length and 
blocking patents on R&D in developed countries, such as the US. I find that eliminating blocking 
patents is more effective in stimulating R&D than extending the patent length. A potential topic 
for future research is to develop a suitable quantitative framework to analyze technology transfer 
from developed countries to less-developed economies that could lead to important policy 
implications on closing the world-income gap.  
 
The political economy of patent policy is also an area that deserves further investigation, 
and the analysis may provide surprising insights. For example, in Chapter IV, I show that the 
presence of a pharmaceutical SIG lobbying the government, who would otherwise act as a social 
planner, to distort the level of patent protection may improve global welfare in a multi-country 
setting. Another potential topic for future research is to investigate the implications on economic 
growth and social welfare from modifying standard economic assumptions based on well-
















Appendix A: Proofs for Chapter II 
Lemma 1: The aggregate production function for the final goods is  
(A1) 
ααηϑ −= 1 ,,)( txtxttt LKZAY , 
where )1/()()( θθηϑ ηθη −+≡ zz  is decreasing in η  for )1,0(∈θ . 
 












)(lnexp djjXY tt . 
After substituting )( jX t  for ]1,0[∈j  into (A2) and assuming cost minimization in the 

















































≡ ∫∫   






















for )1,0(∈θ . )(ηϑ  represents the static distortionary effect of markup pricing, and it enters the 
aggregate production function as   
(A6) 
ααηϑ −= 1 ,,)( txtxttt LKZAY . 






















Proposition 1: )(, jV ti  for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and ]1,[θ∈j  is determined by the following law of 
motion 
(A8) ))()(()()()( ,,1,, jVjVjVjjVr titittititit −++Ω= +λπ & , 









































Proof: The expected present value of the ownership in patent pools for the i-th most recent 
inventor in industry ]1,[θ∈j  is 



















































xs dxsf λλ exp)(  is the density function of s that is a random variable 
representing the time when the next innovation occurs and follows the Erlang distribution. The 
first term in )(, jV ti  is the expected present value of monopolistic profit captured by the i-th most 
recent inventor in the current patent pool. The second term in )(, jV ti  is the expected present 
value of the ownership in patent pools when the i-th most recent inventor becomes the i+1-th 
most recent inventor. Note that 0)(,1 =+ jV tη  because the 1+η -th most recent inventor is no 
longer in any patent pool. In order to derive (A8), I differentiate (A10) with respect to t. To 






ti dsstgjV ),()(, , 
































−Ω= ∫∫ ∫ +π . Then, using the 












































































∫∫ ∫ + ππλ . 





titittsitti dssfjjVrjVjV )()()()()()( ,,1, πλλ& . 
Finally, after setting 1)( =∫
∞
t
dssf , (A14) becomes (A8).  



















where 0)(,1 =+ jV tη . Recursive substitutions show that )(,1 jV t  can be re-expressed as (A9).□ 
 



























.* ,  
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and the socially optimal steady-state R&D shares of labor 
*
Ls  and capital 
*























































Proof: To derive the socially optimal rate of capital investment and R&D shares of labor and 




















subject to: (a) the aggregate production function expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
(A20) 
αααα −−−−= 11,, )1()1( tttLtKttt LKssZAY ; 
(b) the law of motion for capital expressed in terms of ti  given by 
(A21) δtttt KYiK −=& ;  
and (c) the law of motion for R&D technology expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
(A22) zLKssAA tttLtKtt ln)()(
)1()1(
,, ϕ
γββγγββγφ −−=& . 



















































































































































































































































































































Note that the first-order conditions with respect to the co-state variables tK ,υ  and tA,υ  yield the 






































































































































































Finally, solving (A29)-(A33) yields (A16)-(A18).□  
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Proposition 2a: The decentralized equilibrium rate of capital investment i  is below the socially 
optimal investment rate 
*
i  if either there is underinvestment in R&D or labor is the only factor 
input for R&D. 
 
Proof: The socially optimal capital investment rate 
*
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 is sufficient 
for ii >*  because 1/)1( <−+ ηη θθ zz  for )1,0[∈θ .□  
 
Proposition 2b: Holding the backloading discount factor ν  constant, an increase in patent 
breadth leads to a reduction in the decentralized equilibrium rate of capital investment i  if the 
intermediate-goods sector is at least as capital intensive as the R&D sector.   
 
































Since n>ρ  and 1≥σ , βα ≥  is a sufficient condition for 0/ <∂∂ ηi .□ 
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Lemma 3: For βα = , the expression for the endogenous parts of consumption on the balanced-
























0 ))(1()())(1()()( rr ssiic . 
 
Proof: The following derivation applies to the more general case in which α  and β  can be 
different. Without loss of generality, time is re-normalized such that time 0 is the first-period in 
which the economy reaches the balanced-growth path. The balanced-growth path of per capita 
consumption (in log) can be written as  
(A38) tgcc ct += 0lnln , 
where tgc  represents the exogenous growth path of consumption because of the semi-
endogenous growth formulation. The balanced-growth level of per capital consumption at time 0 


















ZAssic LK , 
where 0Z  is normalized to one. The capital-labor ratio 00 / LK  and the level of R&D-driven 
















































































After dropping the exogenous growth path and some constant terms, the expression for the 
endogenous parts of per capita consumption on the balanced-growth path that depends on )(
~
ηϑ , 







































































Finally, after setting βα =  and dropping )(
~
ηϑ , (A42) becomes (A37).□ 
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Appendix B: Transition Dynamics for Chapter II 
This appendix provides the details of transforming the variables in equations (44) – (47) 
into their stationary forms for the purpose of computing the transition dynamics numerically. To 
simplify the analysis, the transformation is performed for the special case of βα = . The Euler 
equation is  
(B1) σρ /)( −= ttt rcc& . 
Define a stationary variable 





















The law of motion for physical capital is  
(B3) δtttt KCYK −−=& . 
























The law of motion for R&D-driven technology is  
(B5) zAA ttt lnλ=
& . 
Define a stationary variable ϕγααγφααγαγ ttttt LZAka














t +−+−−−−= − δαγγλφαγηϑαγ α
&
. 
The law of motion for the market value of ownership in patent pools is given by  
(B7) titittittti VVrV πλλ Ω−−+= + ,1,, )(&  
for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and 0,1 =+ tVη . Define a stationary variable ))(/(
~ )1/(1
,,
α−≡ ttttiti ZALVv , and its 

















































for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and 0~ ,1 =+ tvη . To close this system of differential equations, the endogenous 
variables },,{
., ttrt
sr λ  are also expressed in terms of the four newly defined stationary variables. 
The interest rate is  
(B9) δµθµθηαϑ α −−+= − /)1()( 1tt kr . 





























From the law of motion of R&D-driven technology, the Poisson arrival rate of innovations is  
(B11) ttrt as
γλ ,. = . 
Finally, the steady-state values of the variables are  





































































































for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and 0~ 1 =+ηv . Note that upon eliminating blocking patents, the backloading 
discount factor ν  and the share of profit captured by the most recent inventor 1Ω  become one. 
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Appendix C: The Social Rate of Return to R&D for Chapter II 
Jones and Williams (1998) define the social rate of return as the sum of the additional 
output produced and the reduction in R&D that is made possible by reallocating one unit of 
output from consumption to R&D in the current period and then reducing R&D in the next period 
to leave the subsequent path of technology unchanged. To conform to their notations, I rewrite 
the law of motion for R&D technology as  
(C1) zRARAGA ttttt ln),( ϕ
γφ≡=& , 
where 
αα −≡ 1 ,, trtrt LKR . The aggregate production function is rewritten as  
(C2) tttttt XZAXAFY )(),( ηϑ≡= , 
where 
αα −≡ 1 ,, txtxt LKX . Using the above definition, Jones and Williams (1998) show that the gross 





















































































Appendix D: Tables and Figures for Chapter II 
λ ν α σ r µ λ ν α σ r µ
0.04 0.847 0.287 2.359 0.084 1.030 0.04 0.852 0.288 2.363 0.084 1.040
0.06 0.696 0.287 2.359 0.084 1.030 0.06 0.700 0.288 2.363 0.084 1.040
0.08 0.620 0.287 2.359 0.084 1.030 0.08 0.624 0.288 2.363 0.084 1.040
0.10 0.575 0.287 2.359 0.084 1.030 0.10 0.578 0.288 2.363 0.084 1.040
0.12 0.545 0.287 2.359 0.084 1.030 0.12 0.548 0.288 2.363 0.084 1.040
0.14 0.523 0.287 2.359 0.084 1.030 0.14 0.526 0.288 2.363 0.084 1.040
0.16 0.507 0.287 2.359 0.084 1.030 0.16 0.510 0.288 2.363 0.084 1.040
0.18 0.495 0.287 2.359 0.084 1.030 0.18 0.497 0.288 2.363 0.084 1.040
0.20 0.485 0.287 2.359 0.084 1.030 0.20 0.487 0.288 2.363 0.084 1.040
λ ν α σ r µ λ ν α σ r µ
0.04 0.862 0.288 2.372 0.084 1.061 0.04 0.892 0.288 2.397 0.085 1.126
0.06 0.708 0.288 2.372 0.084 1.061 0.06 0.732 0.288 2.397 0.085 1.126
0.08 0.631 0.288 2.372 0.084 1.061 0.08 0.652 0.288 2.397 0.085 1.126
0.10 0.585 0.288 2.372 0.084 1.061 0.10 0.604 0.288 2.397 0.085 1.126
0.12 0.554 0.288 2.372 0.084 1.061 0.12 0.572 0.288 2.397 0.085 1.126
0.14 0.532 0.288 2.372 0.084 1.061 0.14 0.549 0.288 2.397 0.085 1.126
0.16 0.515 0.288 2.372 0.084 1.061 0.16 0.532 0.288 2.397 0.085 1.126
0.18 0.503 0.288 2.372 0.084 1.061 0.18 0.519 0.288 2.397 0.085 1.126
0.20 0.492 0.288 2.372 0.084 1.061 0.20 0.508 0.288 2.397 0.085 1.126
Table II-1a: Structural Parameters for θ = 0 Table II-1b: Structural Parameters for θ = 0.25
Table II-1c: Structural Parameters for θ = 0.5 Table II-1d: Structural Parameters for θ = 0.75
 
ξ / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1.00 0.81 0.63 0.44 0.25 0.07 -0.12 -0.31 -0.49 -0.68 -0.86
0.90 0.79 0.59 0.38 0.17 -0.04 -0.24 -0.45 -0.66 -0.86 -1.07
0.80 0.77 0.53 0.30 0.07 -0.17 -0.40 -0.63 -0.86 -1.10 -1.33
0.70 0.73 0.47 0.20 -0.07 -0.33 -0.60 -0.86 -1.13 -1.40 -1.66
0.60 0.69 0.38 0.07 -0.24 -0.55 -0.86 -1.18 -1.49 -1.80 -2.11
0.50 0.63 0.25 -0.12 -0.49 -0.86 -1.24 -1.61 -1.98 -2.36 -2.73
0.40 0.53 0.07 -0.40 -0.86 -1.33 -1.80 -2.26 -2.73 -3.19 -3.66
0.30 0.38 -0.24 -0.86 -1.49 -2.11 -2.73 -3.35 -3.97 -4.59 -5.21
0.20 0.07 -0.86 -1.80 -2.73 -3.66 -4.59 -5.53 -6.46 -7.39 -8.32
0.10 -0.86 -2.73 -4.59 -6.46 -8.32 -10.19 -12.05 -13.92 -15.78 -17.64
0.00 -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞






ξ / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1.00 0.81 0.63 0.44 0.25 0.07 -0.12 -0.31 -0.49 -0.68 -0.86
0.90 0.79 0.59 0.38 0.17 -0.04 -0.24 -0.45 -0.66 -0.86 -1.07
0.80 0.77 0.53 0.30 0.07 -0.17 -0.40 -0.63 -0.86 -1.10 -1.33
0.70 0.73 0.47 0.20 -0.07 -0.33 -0.60 -0.86 -1.13 -1.40 -1.66
0.60 0.69 0.38 0.07 -0.24 -0.55 -0.86 -1.18 -1.49 -1.80 -2.11
0.50 0.63 0.25 -0.12 -0.49 -0.86 -1.24 -1.61 -1.98 -2.36 -2.73
0.40 0.53 0.07 -0.40 -0.86 -1.33 -1.80 -2.26 -2.73 -3.20 -3.66
0.30 0.38 -0.24 -0.86 -1.49 -2.11 -2.73 -3.35 -3.97 -4.59 -5.22
0.20 0.07 -0.86 -1.80 -2.73 -3.66 -4.59 -5.53 -6.46 -7.39 -8.32
0.10 -0.86 -2.73 -4.59 -6.46 -8.32 -10.19 -12.05 -13.92 -15.78 -17.65
0.00 -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞
ξ / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1.00 0.81 0.63 0.44 0.25 0.07 -0.12 -0.31 -0.49 -0.68 -0.87
0.90 0.79 0.59 0.38 0.17 -0.04 -0.24 -0.45 -0.66 -0.87 -1.07
0.80 0.77 0.53 0.30 0.07 -0.17 -0.40 -0.63 -0.87 -1.10 -1.33
0.70 0.73 0.47 0.20 -0.07 -0.33 -0.60 -0.87 -1.13 -1.40 -1.66
0.60 0.69 0.38 0.07 -0.24 -0.55 -0.87 -1.18 -1.49 -1.80 -2.11
0.50 0.63 0.25 -0.12 -0.49 -0.87 -1.24 -1.61 -1.98 -2.36 -2.73
0.40 0.53 0.07 -0.40 -0.87 -1.33 -1.80 -2.26 -2.73 -3.20 -3.66
0.30 0.38 -0.24 -0.87 -1.49 -2.11 -2.73 -3.35 -3.97 -4.60 -5.22
0.20 0.07 -0.87 -1.80 -2.73 -3.66 -4.60 -5.53 -6.46 -7.39 -8.33
0.10 -0.87 -2.73 -4.60 -6.46 -8.33 -10.19 -12.06 -13.92 -15.79 -17.65
0.00 -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞
ξ / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1.00 0.81 0.63 0.44 0.25 0.07 -0.12 -0.31 -0.49 -0.68 -0.87
0.90 0.79 0.59 0.38 0.17 -0.04 -0.24 -0.45 -0.66 -0.87 -1.07
0.80 0.77 0.53 0.30 0.07 -0.17 -0.40 -0.63 -0.87 -1.10 -1.33
0.70 0.73 0.47 0.20 -0.07 -0.33 -0.60 -0.87 -1.13 -1.40 -1.67
0.60 0.69 0.38 0.07 -0.24 -0.56 -0.87 -1.18 -1.49 -1.80 -2.11
0.50 0.63 0.25 -0.12 -0.49 -0.87 -1.24 -1.61 -1.99 -2.36 -2.73
0.40 0.53 0.07 -0.40 -0.87 -1.33 -1.80 -2.27 -2.73 -3.20 -3.67
0.30 0.38 -0.24 -0.87 -1.49 -2.11 -2.73 -3.35 -3.98 -4.60 -5.22
0.20 0.07 -0.87 -1.80 -2.73 -3.67 -4.60 -5.53 -6.46 -7.40 -8.33
0.10 -0.87 -2.73 -4.60 -6.46 -8.33 -10.20 -12.06 -13.93 -15.80 -17.66
0.00 -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞ -∞
Table II-2b: Calibrated Values of ϕ for θ  = 0.25
Table II-2c: Calibrated Values of ϕ for θ  = 0.5





ξ / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1.00 0.15 0.27 0.38 0.49 0.61 0.72 0.83 0.95 1.06 1.18
0.90 0.14 0.24 0.34 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.86 0.96 1.06
0.80 0.13 0.22 0.31 0.40 0.49 0.58 0.67 0.76 0.86 0.95
0.70 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.51 0.59 0.67 0.75 0.83
0.60 0.11 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.51 0.58 0.65 0.71
0.50 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.60
0.40 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.48
0.30 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.36
0.20 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.25
0.10 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
ξ / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1.00 0.15 0.27 0.38 0.49 0.61 0.72 0.83 0.95 1.06 1.18
0.90 0.14 0.24 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.86 0.96 1.06
0.80 0.13 0.22 0.31 0.40 0.49 0.58 0.67 0.76 0.86 0.95
0.70 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.51 0.59 0.67 0.75 0.83
0.60 0.11 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.51 0.58 0.65 0.71
0.50 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.60
0.40 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.48
0.30 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.36
0.20 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.25
0.10 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
ξ / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1.00 0.15 0.27 0.38 0.49 0.61 0.72 0.84 0.95 1.06 1.18
0.90 0.14 0.24 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.86 0.96 1.06
0.80 0.13 0.22 0.31 0.40 0.49 0.58 0.67 0.76 0.86 0.95
0.70 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.36 0.43 0.51 0.59 0.67 0.75 0.83
0.60 0.11 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.51 0.58 0.65 0.71
0.50 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.60
0.40 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.48
0.30 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.36
0.20 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.25
0.10 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Table II-3a: The Implied Social Rates of Return for θ  = 0
Table II-3b: The Implied Social Rates of Return for θ  = 0.25




ξ / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1.00 0.15 0.27 0.38 0.49 0.61 0.72 0.84 0.95 1.06 1.18
0.90 0.14 0.24 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.76 0.86 0.96 1.06
0.80 0.13 0.22 0.31 0.40 0.49 0.58 0.67 0.77 0.86 0.95
0.70 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.36 0.43 0.51 0.59 0.67 0.75 0.83
0.60 0.11 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.51 0.58 0.65 0.72
0.50 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.60
0.40 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.48
0.30 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.37
0.20 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.25
0.10 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Table II-3d: The Implied Social Rates of Return for θ  = 0.75
 
θ / λ 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.00 0.0136 0.0165 0.0185 0.0200 0.0211 0.0219 0.0226 0.0232 0.0237
0.25 0.0135 0.0164 0.0184 0.0199 0.0210 0.0218 0.0225 0.0231 0.0236
0.50 0.0133 0.0162 0.0182 0.0196 0.0207 0.0216 0.0223 0.0228 0.0233
0.75 0.0129 0.0157 0.0176 0.0190 0.0201 0.0209 0.0216 0.0221 0.0226
Table II-4: R&D Shares without Blocking Patents
 
θ / λ 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.00 0.204 0.204 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.206 0.206 0.206
0.25 0.204 0.204 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.206 0.206 0.206
0.50 0.204 0.204 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.206 0.206
0.75 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.206






























































Data Sources: (a) Bureau of Economic Analysis: National Income and Product Accounts Tables; 
and (b) National Science Foundation: Division of Science Resources Statistics.  
Footnote: R&D is net of federal spending, and GDP is net of government spending. 
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Data Source: Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002): The NBER Patent Citation Data File. 
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Figure II-5a: Transition Dynamics of Consumption for ξ = γ = 0.55 with Partial Capital Depreciation 
 
Figure II-5b: Transition Dynamics of Consumption for ξ = γ = 0.55 with Complete Depreciation 
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Figure II-5c: Transition Dynamics of Consumption for ξ = γ = 0.3 with Partial Depreciation 
 
Figure II-5d: Transition Dynamics of Consumption for ξ = 0.95 and γ = 0.3 with Partial Depreciation 
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Appendix E: Proofs for Chapter III  
Lemma 1: The aggregate production function for the final goods is  
(E1) 





~ −−−= , 
where tA  is the level of R&D-driven TFP and is defined as 
(E2) 
ηαηα /)1(1 −− ≡ tt VA , 
and 
.


















~ω  is strictly less than one for )1,0(
.
∈ω  and equals one for }1,0{
.
∈ω . In addition, 



















ωω .  
 
Proof: (7), (10) and (11) imply that )()()( )1/(1 jXjX tt ′=
−αηαη . Substituting this condition into 
(12) and then the resulting condition into (5) yields the aggregate production function. For 
}1,0{
.
































































































Lemma 2: The socially optimal rate of capital investment 
*





































and the socially optimal R&D shares of labor 
*
Ls  and capital 
*




































































Proof: To derive the socially optimal rate of capital investment and R&D shares of labor and 




















subject to: (a) the aggregate production function expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
(E10) 
αααααηαη −−−− −−= 11,,
1/)1( )1()1( tttLtKttt LKssZVY ; 
(b) the law of motion for capital expressed in terms of ti  given by 
(E11) δtttt KYiK −=& ;  
and (c) the law of motion for R&D technology expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
(E12) ϕγββγγββγφ )1()1(,, )()(
−−= tttLtKtt LKssVV
& . 




























































































































































































































































































































Note that the first-order conditions with respect to the co-state variables tK ,υ  and tV ,υ  yield the 


















































































































































































Finally, solving (E19)-(E23) yields (E6)-(E8).□  
 
Proposition 1: The decentralized equilibrium capital investment rate i  is below the socially 
optimal investment rate 
*
i  if either there is underinvestment in R&D or labor is the only factor 
input for R&D. In addition, an increase in the patent length always reduces the equilibrium 



















































































Thus, either (i) labor is the only factor input for R&D such that 0=β , or (ii) there is 





































 is a sufficient 
condition for 
*
ii <  because 1ˆ <ω .□ 
 
Proof for 0/ <∂∂ Ti : Recall that )(ˆ
.






































































































. Recall that the 







































































































































































































































 for ),0( ∞∈T .□  
 
Lemma 3: For βα = , the expression for the endogenous parts of consumption on the balanced-



















































Proof: The following derivation applies to the more general case in which α  and β  can be 



















































































































ssZAV  . 































A .  
Finally, substituting (E26) and (E28) into (E25) and dropping the exogenous terms yield the 
expression for the balanced-growth level of per capita consumption corresponding to the patent 









































































Finally, after setting βα = , (E29) becomes (E24).□  
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Appendix F: The Social Rate of Return to R&D for Chapter III 
Jones and Williams (1998) define the social rate of return as the sum of the additional 
output produced and the reduction in R&D that is made possible by reallocating one unit of 
output from consumption to R&D in the current period and then reducing R&D in the next period 
to leave the subsequent path of technology unchanged. I rewrite the law of motion for R&D 
technology as  
(F1) 
γφϕ ttttt RVRVGV .),( ≡=& , 
where 
αα −≡ 1 ,, trtrt LKR . The aggregate production function is rewritten as  
(F2) 





~),,,( −−−≡= . 

























































































Appendix G: Tables and Figures for Chapter III 
gπ σ α η ξ gV µ r
-0.10 2.872 0.310 2.970 0.338 0.131 1.085 0.082
-0.15 2.907 0.310 3.008 0.391 0.181 1.071 0.083
-0.20 2.933 0.310 3.024 0.458 0.231 1.065 0.083
Table III-1: Calibrated Structural Parameters
 
gπ / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
-0.10 0.984 0.968 0.952 0.935 0.919 0.903 0.887 0.871 0.855 0.839
-0.15 0.988 0.977 0.965 0.953 0.942 0.930 0.918 0.907 0.895 0.883
-0.20 0.991 0.982 0.973 0.963 0.954 0.945 0.936 0.927 0.918 0.908
Table III-2: The Implied Values for ϕ
 
gπ / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
-0.10 5.0% 7.0% 8.9% 10.8% 12.7% 14.6% 16.5% 18.4% 20.3% 22.2%
-0.15 5.3% 7.4% 9.6% 11.7% 13.9% 16.0% 18.1% 20.3% 22.4% 24.6%
-0.20 5.6% 8.0% 10.5% 12.9% 15.3% 17.8% 20.2% 22.7% 25.1% 27.5%
Table III-3: The Implied Social Rates of Return to R&D
 














































































Appendix H: Proofs for Chapter IV 
Proposition 2: There exists a )1,0(ˆ ∈σ  such that if and only if σσ ˆ≥ , 0/0 ≥∂∂ ςC  for 
)1,0(∈ς . 
 
Proof: The welfare of the government is firstly rescaled so that one dollar for the government has 
the same utility weight as one dollar for the SIG. Dividing (47) by ς , 
(H1) 00 /)1)((/),(
~
CTWCTW +−= ςςς . 
The total surplus of the government and the SIG at 




SIGSIG −+−−= θςς . 
Differentiating (H2) with respect to 
































Multiplying (H3) by ς  and substituting (44) into (H3) yields the same first-order condition as 
(50). From Assumption 3, the amount of surplus captured by the government is TS
.




* /)1)](()([ σςς =+−− . 
Rearranging some terms, (H4) becomes 
(H5) )],(),([/)1)](()()[1( **0 . TIUTIUTWTWC
SIGSIG −+−−−= σθςςσ . 































Note that 0)()( * >− SIGTWTW , 0/)( <∂∂ ςSIGTW , and 0/),( >∂∂ ςSIGTIU . The next step 




ςC . I will show this in 
three steps: (i) 0/
.0








































Note that 0/)()1(/)]()([ * >∂∂−+− ςςς SIGSIG TWTWTW  because )1(/1 ςς −>  for 












































Thus, there must exist a )1,0(ˆ ∈σ  such that if and only if σσ ˆ≥ , 0/0 ≥∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς .□ 
 
Corollary 1a: The government having the first-mover advantage to make a take-or-leave-it offer 
to the SIG is equivalent to 1=σ . In this case, )),(),(( *0 TIUTIUC
SIG −= θ  and 0/0 >∂∂ ςC  
for )1,0(∈ς . 
 
Proof: At the social optimum 




In the political equilibrium },{ 0CT
SIG
, the welfare of the SIG is  
(H11) 0),(. CTIU
SIG −θ . 
Therefore, the maximum amount that the SIG is willing to pay as campaign contributions is the 
amount for which it is indifferent between ))},(),((,{},{ *0 TIUTIUTCT
SIGSIG −= θ  and 
}0,{},{ *0 TCT = . Therefore, the participation constraint is  
(H12) )),(),(( *0 TIUTIUC
SIG −≤ θ . 
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Since the government has the first-mover advantage, it would make an offer to the SIG such that 
the participation constraint is binding. Note that setting 1=σ  in (H5) yields  
(H13) )],(),([ *0 . TIUTIUC
SIG −= θ . 
Therefore, 1=σ  is equivalent to the case in which the government has the first-mover advantage 
to make a take-or-leave-it offer to the SIG. In this case, 0/0 >∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς  as shown in 
(H9).□  
 
Corollary 1b: The SIG having the first-mover advantage to make a take-or-leave-it offer to the 
government is equivalent to 0=σ . In this case, ςς /)1))(()(( *0 −−=
SIG
TWTWC  and 
0/
.0 <∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς .  
 
Proof: At the social optimum 
*T , the welfare of the government is  
(H14) ςς /)1)(( * −TW . 
In the political equilibrium },{ 0CT
SIG
, the welfare of the government is  
(H15) 0/)1)(( CTW
SIG +− ςς . 
Therefore, the minimum amount that the government is willing to accept as campaign 
contributions to implement 
SIGT  is the amount for which it is indifferent between 




TWTWTCT . Therefore, the 
participation constraint is  
(H16) ςς /)1)](()([ *0 −−≥
SIG
TWTWC . 
Since the SIG has the first-mover advantage, it would make an offer to the government such that 
the participation constraint is binding. Note that setting 0=σ  in (H5) yields  




Therefore, 0=σ  is equivalent to the case in which the SIG has the first-mover advantage to 
make a take-or-leave-it offer to the government. In this case, 0/0 <∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς  as 
shown in (H8).□  
 
Lemma 3: The Nash-equilibrium patent length is decreasing in N and is strictly below the 
symmetric globally optimal patent length when the number of countries is at least two. 
 
Proof: Recall that 

































































which is negative by (a4). The symmetric globally optimal patent length, denoted by 
GOT , is 





























Therefore, for 2≥N , GONE TT < .□ 
 
Proposition 3: When 1=N , )()( *TWTW SIG <   for ]1,0(∈ς . When 2≥N , there exists a ς̂  
such that for ]ˆ,0( ςς ∈ , )()( NEsSIGs TWTW > , and ς̂  is increasing in N . Furthermore, for 
any given )1,0(~ ∈ς , there exists a N
~
 such that if NN
~
≥ , ),(),( NEsSIGs TIIUTIIU > . 
 
Proof: Recall that the symmetric SIG patent length 


























































GOT  is determined by (H19) and is independent of N . Denote the value of ς  that solves 
(H21) by ς̂ . When 1=N , ς̂  must equal zero for (H21) to hold. When 2≥N , 0ˆ >ς  and 
0/ˆ >∂∂ Nς . Note that when ςς ˆ> , it is not necessarily true that )()( NEsSIGs TWTW < . In this 
case, it simply involves the comparison of two globally suboptimal levels of patent protection 
NET  and )(ςSIGT . 
 To show that even Type-II households may benefit from the pharmaceutical lobbies, (42) 




























The left-hand side is increasing in N while the right-hand side is decreasing is decreasing in N. 
Therefore, there exists a unique N for which the Nash-equilibrium patent length coincides with 
the symmetric desired patent length of Type-II households. When the number of countries 
exceeds this threshold, even Type-II households would find the Nash-equilibrium patent length 






















Denote the value of ς  that solves (H24) by ς~ . For any given )1,0(~ ∈ς , there exists a N
~
 such 
that (H24) holds. In this case, 
SIGT  coincides with *IIT  .   
 
Proposition 4: Suppose that at the symmetric political equilibrium with 021 >== ςςς
)
, both 
countries are better off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then, there must exist a 
),0( ςς
)(
∈  such that when ςς
)
=1  and ],0[2 ςς
(
∈ , country 1 is worse off compared to the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
 















































The best response function shows that 
1T  and 2T  are strategic substitutes and 0/ >∂∂ ssT ς . 














212 ,ςςT .  
 Suppose that at the symmetric political equilibrium ),( SIGSIG TT  with 021 >== ςςς
)
, 
both countries are better off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium ),( NENE TT . We know 
from Proposition 3 that such ς
)
 always exists. At ςς
)
=1  and 02 =ς , SIGTT >1  and NETT <2 . 
Therefore, there must exist a ),0( ςς
)(
∈  such that when ςς
)
=1  and ςς
(
=2 , NETT =2 . At this 
point, the social best response of country 1 is to set 
NETT =1 , but it is setting NESIG TTT >>1 . 
Therefore, it must be worse off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Finally, if country 
1 is worse off at ςς
(




Appendix I: Tables and Figures for Chapter IV 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Lobbying expenditures 72.08 88.58 102.14 97.53 125.26 120.73 128.64 139.62 148.16
Election cycle 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Campaign contributions 3.97 9.17 8.54 14.67 13.65 26.69 28.30 16.48 16.64
Data source: opensecrets.org (http://www.opensecrets.org)
Footnotes: 
(b) Soft-money contributions were banned by the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act following the 2002 
elections.
Table IV-1: Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions by the Pharmaceutical Industry
(in real 2000 US$ million)
(a) Campaign contributions include direct and soft-money contributions. Soft-money contributions to the national 
parties were not publicly disclosed until the 1991-92 election cycle. 
 







 (a) Hatch-Waxman: The Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
 (b) PDUFA: The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992
 (c) URAA: The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994
 (d) FDAMA: The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
Table IV-2: Extension in Commercial Lifetime of Patents and Market Exclusivity for Drugs
 
Year 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-05
Sales 13,714 31,878 49,433 100,886 180,901
Pretax Income 2,713 6,051 9,732 23,376 42,000
Intangible Assets 582 1,028 2,978 22,956 65,474
Table IV-3: Financial Figures of the Top 10 Pharmaceutical Companies in Fortune 500
Data source: COMPUSTAT North America
Footnotes: 
(a) According to CNNMoney.com, the Top 10 companies in 2006 are: Abbott Laboratories, Amgen, Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Eli Lilly, Forest Laboratories, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, Schering-Plough, and Wyeth.
(b) The figures do not include the data for Amgen because it does not have a complete time series for the above
years.
(c) For J&J, Eli Lilly, Pfizer, and Schering-Plough, intangible assets include both intangible assets and other assets
because intangible assets were included in other assets for some years.
(in real 2000 US$ million)
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1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
3,494 3,946 4,445 4,897 4,997 5,135 5,595 6,473 7,015 7,251 8,225
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
9,182 10,332 10,664 11,078 10,410 12,143 13,025 12,502 12,854 9,899 13,614
Data source: National Science Foundation - Division of Science Resources Statistics
Footnote: R&D is net of Federal spending.
Table IV-4: Private R&D Spending on Phamaceuticals and Medicines





1. NE refers to the Nash-equilibrium patent length, and the bold lines are the social best 
response functions of country 1 and country 2.   
2. PE refers to the political-equilibrium patent length, and the dotted lines are the SIG best 
response functions of country 1 and country 2.  
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